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ARTICLE
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BETTER
SAFEGUARDS:
LOOKING BEYOND MIRANDA IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM
MANDY DEFILIPPO

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona1 is one of
the most widely known in American jurisprudence.2 Lawyers and
non-lawyers alike are familiar with the Mirandawarnings,3 which
police must read to suspects prior to custodial questioning of any
kind. Police dramas in movies and on television have further
popularized the warnings by using them as a dramatic signal to
the audience that the suspect in question is being arrested and
booked, and that the detectives who found him are only one
interrogation away from solving the crime.
The Miranda decision did more than supply a convenient
*

J.D., Harvard Law School, 2000. Dedicated to the late Professor James

Vorenberg, whose thoughts and guidance were indispensable to the writing of
this Article. I would also like to thank Professor Charles Ogletree and
William D. McCants for his extremely valuable comments and suggestions.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
2. It was the most widely known case in criminal jurisprudence in 1974,
when a survey of lawyers conducted by the American Bar Association found
that Miranda was the third most notable Supreme Court decision of all time.
The only two cases which received more votes than Miranda in the survey
were Marbury v. Madison and United States v. Nixon. Brown v. Board of
Education finished fourth. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, MILESTONES! 200 YEARS
OF AMERICAN LAW: MILESTONES IN OUR LEGAL HISTORY vii (1976).
3. The Miranda warnings are as follows: "You have the right to remain
silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will
be provided for you free of charge." See Miranda,384 U.S. at 467-473; Richard
Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621,
628 (1996) (indicating that Miranda requires a knowing, voluntary and
intelligent waiver of these rights for a confession obtained during custodial
interrogation to be admissible in court). Police generally secure the knowing,
voluntary and intelligent waiver of a suspect's Miranda rights by requiring
suspects to sign a form to that effect, or by asking explicitly whether a suspect
understands his rights. Leo, supra at 650.
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plot-forwarding technique to producers of television police shows.

Miranda changed the standard by which confessions were deemed
voluntary and therefore admissible at trial as part of the
prosecution's case in chief. Before Miranda, the standard by
which courts would determine a confession's admissibility was the
due process or "voluntariness" test. As applied by the Supreme
Court, the due process or "voluntariness" standard was not meant
to parse between those confessions which were truly voluntary and
those which were not; such a standard would require an almostimpossible inquiry into the suspect's state of mind during the
interrogation.4 Instead, this standard used a number of factors as
a proxy to determine whether a suspect's confession was voluntary
as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. If the application of
factors to the particular case indicated that the confession (or
incriminating statement) was "voluntary" in the manner in which
that term was used by the Court, then the statement was held to
comport with the protections required by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and was therefore admissible.5 After Miranda,
however, the relevant question became whether the suspect was
informed of and understood his rights to silence and counsel before
he confessed to a crime or made an incriminating statement. Only
if a suspect was informed of and understood these rights before
custodial interrogation began is the resulting confession
admissible as part of the prosecution's case in chief.
This Article will consider the current protections offered by
the Miranda doctrine in the context of Dickerson v. United States,6
the Supreme Court's most recent decision regarding the
constitutionality of the thirty-five year old rule. At issue in
Dickerson was the Fourth Circuit's decision that a Congressional
statute, which was passed only two years after Miranda was
decided, superseded the Miranda doctrine in federal court.7 The
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, sought to reinstate the voluntariness
test, derived from the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, as
the standard governing the admissibility of confessions in federal

4. See YALE KAMISAR, What is an Involuntary Confession?, in POLICE
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1-25 (1980) (discussing the exclusivity of

the "voluntariness" test).
5. Because "voluntariness" is very much a term of art used by the Court,
rather than an actual determination of voluntariness as such, I use the terms
"due process standard" and "voluntariness standard" interchangeably
throughout this Article. Both terms refer to the standard articulated by the
Court to determine whether a confession is admissible before Miranda was
decided, or after a suspect's voluntary and intelligent waiver of his Miranda
rights. My synonymous use of these terms to describe the same standard
comports with their use in the literature and case law pertaining to this topic.
See, e.g., id.
6. 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000).
7. Id. at 2329-30.
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trials.
Citing the Court's decisions modifying the Miranda
doctrine,8 the Fourth Circuit decided that the Miranda warnings
were not constitutional requirements, but were merely
prophylactic procedural rules which Congress could override.9
Thus, in Dickerson, the Miranda doctrine faced its most
fundamental challenge since its inception: whether its rule is
required by the Constitution itself.
On June 26, 2000, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth
Circuit by a 7-2 vote and held that the Miranda doctrine is a
constitutionally required standard. °
The decision explicitly
approved the Miranda doctrine in its current form, as it has been
modified through the three decades since it was originally
announced."
The Court further held that the voluntariness
standard which Congress had attempted to reinstate in § 3501 was
not sufficiently protective of suspects' rights to comport with the
basic requirements of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause. 2 Thus, after Dickerson, Miranda in its current form
remains the standard by which confessions are deemed admissible
in all criminal trials in both state and federal courts throughout
the United States.
Given the wide margin by which the doctrine was upheld,
along with the decisive language of the opinion authored by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, it seems clear that constitutional challenges to
the Miranda doctrine are no longer viable. However, the fact that
the Miranda rule is now a clearly constitutionally required
safeguard asks, but fails to answer, the question of how effective a
safeguard the doctrine actually is. Since Miranda was decided,
the Supreme Court has established a number of exceptions to its
seemingly bright-line standard. 3 Police officers have become
increasingly sophisticated interrogators, who have access to
training manuals and courses instructing them in persuasive
psychological techniques with which they can convince almost any
suspect to waive his Miranda rights and confess. 4
Recent
empirical studies of the effects of Miranda on law enforcement
show that as many as 84% of suspects choose to immediately
waive their Miranda rights at the outset of a custodial
8. See, e.g., cases discussed in Part II.B, infra.
9. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 692 (4th Cir.1999).
10. See Dickerson, 120 S.Ct. at 2329.
11. Id. at 2329, 2336.
12. Id. at 2335.
13. See, e.g., cases discussed in Part II.B, infra.
14. See Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern
Interrogators'Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84
MINN. L. REV. 397, 407 (1999) (finding that, in their studies of police
interrogation techniques, police have numerous sophisticated strategies
designed to convince suspects to waive their Miranda rights). See also
discussion of empirical studies, Part II, infra.
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interrogation.15 In light of these facts, some questions about the
current state of the Miranda doctrine are in order. Does the
current Miranda doctrine achieve the goals it originally set out to
achieve? What exactly are we striving to protect in the Miranda
doctrine that was not protected under the due process standard?
Should Miranda be vigorously defended, or even defended at all?
In attempting to answer these questions, this Article will
proceed in five sections. To establish the context for these
inquiries, the Dickerson case and the Congressional alternative to
the Miranda doctrine will be discussed in Part I. In an attempt to
assess the practical protections ensured by the Miranda doctrine,
Part II will discuss the empirical effects of Miranda from the
perspectives of both law enforcement and suspects. In the context
of considering the due process standard as an alternative to the
Mirandadoctrine, an issue of distinct importance to the Dickerson
case, Part III will examine the legal bases of both the due process
standard and the Miranda doctrine as they exist today, and, in
conclusion, will compare the two. Finally, in Part IV, other
alternatives to Miranda will be considered in light of the
conclusions of the previous sections; and in Part V, a new
alternative will be proposed.
I.

UNITED STATES V. DICKERSON: A CALL FOR THE REINSTITUTION
OF THE DUE PROCESS STANDARD

The Supreme Court's decision in Miranda met with
immediate criticism from the law enforcement community. Law
enforcement officials predicted that the requirements Miranda
imposed would seriously hamper police efforts to find, arrest, and
convict criminals. These criticisms caused Congress to enact 18
U.S.C. § 3501 as part of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968.16
Section 3501 was designed to supersede the Miranda doctrine in
15. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the
1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839
(1996); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996) (charting interrogation subjects' responses to the
Mirandawarnings).

16. Section 3501 was also designed to limit the Supreme Court's rule that
any confession obtained in the context of an unreasonable delay between a
suspect's arrest and arraignment is inadmissible at trial. This rule against
"unreasonable delay" is known as the McNabb-Mallory rule, after the two
cases in which it was set forth. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943);
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).

Section 3501(c) provides that,

as long as there are no indications of involuntariness, a delay of six hours or
less does not render a confession inadmissible, and a confession obtained after
a delay of more than six hours does not render a confession inadmissible, if it
is found to be reasonable in light of the time and distance required to take the
defendant before the nearest available magistrate or court officer. 18 U.S.C. §
3501(c); CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 72 (West
3d ed. 1999).
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federal prosecutions, and provides, in pertinent part, that:
[iln any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or the
District of Columbia, a confession... shall be admissible in evidence
if it is voluntarily given ....
[In determining the issue of
voluntariness, [the trial judge] shall take into consideration all the
circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession [including a
list of factors] .... The presence or absence of any of the abovementioned factors... need not be conclusive on the issue of
voluntariness of the confession. 17
In listing the factors with which courts should determine
voluntariness, Congress effectively combined the factors used to
determine voluntariness in the pre-Mirandadue process standard
with some of the warnings articulated in Miranda. The five
factors set forth in the statute are: (1) the amount of time between
arrest and arraignment of the defendant, 8 (2) whether the
defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was
charged or of which he was suspected, (3) whether the defendant
was advised that he was not required to make a statement, and
whether the defendant was advised that any statement he made
could be used against him in court, (4) whether the defendant was
told of his right to the assistance of counsel," and (5) whether the
defendant was without the assistance of counsel when he was
questioned and when he made incriminating statements or gave a
confession. 0 The statute makes clear that no single factor is to be
conclusive in the judge's analysis of whether the statement in
question was voluntarily given (and thus admissible): "The
presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be
taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the
issue of voluntariness of the confession. " 1 Instead, all of the
factors are to be considered in the general inquiry of whether the
defendant's confession was voluntary.
Until the Dickerson case came before it, the Supreme Court

17. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) and (b). The statute effectively restores the law
governing admissibility of confessions to the pre-Miranda due process or
"voluntariness" standard. Id.
18. Although time delay between arrest and arraignment is specifically
addressed by the McNabb-Mallory rule, the due process doctrine prior to
Miranda also considered the length of time a suspect was in custody before
confessing. See Part III. A, infra.
19. Note that factors three and four encompass the rights articulated by the
Court in Miranda. 384 U.S. 469-73. Factor three includes the suspect's right
to silence and to understand that any statements he makes may be used
against him in court, and factor four includes the suspect's right to have an

attorney present during custodial questioning. Id. The factors do not include
the fourth Miranda warning, that the suspect has a right to have an attorney

appointed for him free of charge if he cannot afford one. Id. at 473.
20. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501(b).

21. Id.
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had never considered whether § 3501 overruled Miranda, or,
indeed, whether the statute was constitutional.22 The Court failed
to consider the issue for two reasons. First, the Department of
Justice refused to argue that § 3501 governed confessions obtained
through custodial interrogation, and continued to follow Miranda
as the standard by which such confessions should be admitted at
trial.
This refusal extended consistently through seven
Presidential administrations."
Second, the Court generally
followed a discretionary rule not to consider arguments not raised
before it. Since the government consistently refused to raise the §
3501 issue, the Court declined to consider it.
It should be noted that the Court's refusal to consider the §
3501 issue was based on a discretionary prudential doctrine, not a
mandatory or constitutional one. It would have been legally
possible for the Court to consider the § 3501 issue sua sponte,
despite the government's refusal to argue it. Indeed, Justice
Scalia argued for such consideration in his concurrence in Davis v.
United States,24 the most recent case before Dickerson in which §

3501 would have been applicable. In that case, he wrote:
[Tihe refusal to consider arguments not raised is a sound prudential
practice, rather than a statutory or constitutional mandate, and
there are times when prudence dictates the contrary. As far as I am
concerned, such a time will have arrived when a case that comes

22. It should be noted that, prior to Dickerson lower courts, notably the
Tenth Circuit, considered the § 3501 issue, and found the statute to be
constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 988 F. Supp. 1424, 1429-30 (D. Utah
1997).
23. See Eric Miller, Comment, Should Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. § 3501
Sua Sponte?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1029 (1998) (explaining that there was a
brief period during the Nixon administration during which the Attorney
General indicated that government attorneys could invoke the statute when
there was only a minor deviation from the Miranda doctrine). Courts
generally avoided the issue. Id. at 1034.
24. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). In Davis, the defendant, a member of the U.S.
Navy, was questioned by the Naval Investigative Service about his
involvement in a murder. He was given the Mirandawarnings and waived his
rights to silence and to counsel at the outset of the interrogation. Id. After an
hour and a half of questioning, the defendant said, "Maybe I should talk to a
lawyer." Id. The interrogating officers re-informed him of his rights under
Miranda, and the defendant indicated that he wished to continue without a
lawyer. Id. The interrogation continued for another hour, at which point the
defendant indicated that he would answer no more questions without a
lawyer. Id. The defendant was convicted of murder based on statements he
made during that questioning session. Id. Under Miranda, the Court's
analysis had to consider whether the defendant had invoked his Miranda
rights, as interpreted by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), when he
first stopped the questioning. Id. at 453. If § 3501 were the governing
doctrine, the statements would all have been clearly admissible.
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within the terms of this statute is next presented to us.

2

5

Thirty-two years after Congress passed its statutory
challenge to Miranda, the Court finally addressed the
constitutionality of § 3501, and, by extension, the constitutionality
of Miranda itself. The case presenting the issue was United States
v. Dickerson, in which the Fourth Circuit considered the § 3501
issue head-on and decided that the statute was constitutional, and
that it superseded the Miranda doctrine in federal prosecutions.
In Dickerson, the defendant, Charles Dickerson, confessed to
committing a series of bank robberies in Maryland and Virginia. 7
Following the robbery of the First Virginia Bank in Alexandria,
Virginia, FBI agents spotted what was reported to be the getaway
car outside Dickerson's apartment building in Takoma Park,
Maryland.28 The agents went to Dickerson's apartment and asked
him if he would accompany them to the FBI Field Office in
Washington, D.C.; he agreed to do so. 29 Dickerson was not
formally placed under arrest or handcuffed when he agreed to
answer questions at the FBI office." During the interview, FBI
agents obtained a warrant to search Dickerson's residence."
When the agents informed him of this development, Dickerson
admitted to the robbery in question and to being the getaway
driver in a series of other similar robberies.
Following his
statements, the agents arrested him. 2
The district court granted Dickerson's motion to suppress his
statement. 4 The court found that Dickerson was in custody
during the interview, and that the FBI agents were therefore
required to inform him of his rights under Miranda before
soliciting answers to their questions. 5 Since the statement was
obtained without a prior reading of the Miranda warnings, the
district court held that they were obtained in violation of

25. 512 U.S. at 464.
26. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 695 (4th Cir. 1999).

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 671.
Id. at 673.
Id.
Id.
166 F.3d at 674.
Id.

33. See id. at 675 (discussing the conflicting testimony at trial as to

whether Dickerson was read the Miranda rights before or after he made his
statement). The district court resolved the dispute by finding that Dickerson
made his statement without first being read the Miranda warnings.

Accordingly, the court suppressed the statement, finding that Dickerson was
in police custody when he confessed, and that he confessed in response to
police interrogation, both of which would require that he be read the Miranda
warnings before incriminating himself. Id.

34. Id.
35. Id.
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Miranda.36 Thus, the confession itself was suppressed. 7 However,
the district court allowed into evidence the statement of an
accomplice identifying Dickerson as the getaway driver, even
though the accomplice was found only through Dickerson's own
confession, finding that the confession, although obtained in
violation of Miranda,was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment.38
The government filed a motion requesting the district court to
reconsider its order suppressing Dickerson's statements, arguing
that because the statements
were voluntary, they were admissible
3
under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3501.

1

Although the government raised the issue of the applicability
of § 3501 in its motion to reconsider, it did not brief the issue on
appeal, because the Department of Justice prohibited the U.S.
Attorney's Office from doing so."' However, Paul Cassell, professor
at the University of Utah College of Law, filed an amicus brief
arguing that Miranda did not set forth constitutionally required
rules, and that the voluntariness standard set forth in § 3501
should be the standard by which the admissibility of confessions is
judged in federal court.4" The Fourth Circuit, per Judge Williams,
accepted Cassell's argument and upheld the statute, deciding that
§ 3501, and not Miranda,governed the admissibility of confessions
in federal court.42 In holding the statute constitutional, the Fourth
Circuit noted that in a number of cases since Miranda, the
Supreme Court limited the protective reach of the Miranda
decision. 3 Further, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that the
36. 166 F.3d at 675.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 676 (characterizing the defendant's statement as voluntary

under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). Under Oregon v.
Elstad, the "fruits" of a confession obtained in violation of Miranda are
admissible as part of the prosecution's case in chief. See 470 U.S. 298, 305-07

(1985) (holding that "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply to
Miranda violations, because the Mirandawarnings are prophylactic measures

designed to ensure that a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against
compulsory

self-incrimination

is

not

violated,

rather

than

actual

Constitutional rights).
39. 166 F.3d at 676. The district court also suppressed the evidence found
during the search of Dickerson's apartment, on grounds that the warrant did
not sufficiently describe the items to be seized. Id. The government

accordingly filed an additional motion asking the district court to reconsider
its ruling regarding the evidence seized during the search of Dickerson's
apartment. Id. The Court denied the motions. Id. at 676-77.
40. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 672.
41. See Terry Carter, The Man Who Would Undo Miranda, A.B.A. J. 44, 45
(2000) (describing Cassell's views of Mirandaand § 3501).
42. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 692.

43. See id at 672 (discussing decisions limiting the original scope of
Miranda protections finding that § 3501 controls the admissibility of
confessions in federal courts). See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)
(reasoning that the fruits of statements obtained in violation of Miranda,
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Supreme Court explicitly stated in prior cases that the Miranda
rule was a prophylactic, procedural one, meant to ensure against
the impingement of a suspect's constitutional rights, but not
required by the Constitution itself."' The circuit court concluded
that Congress was within its authority to promulgate rules of
procedure and evidence in the federal courts in enacting § 3501,
and therefore, the statute was constitutional.45 Applying the
statute's voluntariness standard to the facts of the case, the
Fourth Circuit held that, since the district court had found that
Dickerson's confession was voluntary, the confession was therefore
admissible." Dickerson appealed the decision, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the coristitutional question.47
Because neither the government, nor Dickerson himself,
sought to argue that § 3501 was constitutional, the Court
appointed Paul Cassell to argue in favor of the statute as amicus
curiae."
Perhaps the most prominent voice in the legal
community to speak out consistently against Miranda, Cassell
spent much of his career attempting to convince the Supreme
5
Court to reconsider and overrule Miranda."
In attempting to
convince the Court to uphold § 3501 as constitutional, Cassell
attacked Miranda from both legal and policy perspectives, using
many of the same arguments he had leveled against Miranda for
years.
Cassell's basic constitutional argument to the Court against
Miranda was twofold: first, that the rule set forth in Miranda was
not constitutionally required; and second, that Miranda's
protections extended beyond the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment in prohibiting clearly voluntary confessions."
In
including subsequent confessions from the defendant after valid waiver of
Miranda rights, are admissible as part of the prosecution's case in chief); New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (stating that police are not required to
give Miranda warnings when asking a suspects in the field for information

officers need to ensure or secure the public safety); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that statements obtained in violation of Miranda,
although inadmissible as part of the prosecution's case in chief, could be used
to impeach the defendant on the stand at trial).
44. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 690 (reasoning that the Supreme Court does
not equate the Miranda warning with constitutional rights); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (noting that prior case law does not completely
bar all seemingly inadmissible evidence under Miranda); Davis v. United

States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (discussing the need to prevent the transformation
of Mirandainto a "wholly irrational obstacle").
45. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 691.
46. Id. at 692-93.

47. Dickerson v. United States, 528 U.S. 1045 (1999).
48. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct 2326, 2335 n.7 (2000).
49. See Carter, supra note 41, at 45 (recounting Cassell's desire to "fix"
Miranda).

50. See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at 5-6, 12, Dickerson v.
United States, 120 S.Ct. 578 (2000) (No. 99-5525) (arguing that Miranda
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arguing that the Miranda doctrine was not constitutionally
required, Cassell noted that the Court often referred to the
doctrine as prophylactic in limiting the protections of the doctrine
in cases subsequent to Miranda.1 In addition, the Warren Court,
in the Miranda opinion itself, stated that either Congress or the
state legislatures could modify the doctrine." Cassell asserted
that, in passing § 3501, Congress had simply modified the doctrine
53
in accordance with this language in Miranda.
In arguing that
Miranda's protections were overbroad, Cassell noted that the
original rationale for the Miranda rule was that confessions
obtained from suspects not informed of their rights before
custodial interrogation are presumptively involuntary and,
therefore, inadmissible.54
Since the Fifth Amendment only
protects suspects against compulsory (i.e., involuntary) selfincrimination, Miranda's bright-line prohibition against the
admissibility
of confessions
obtained without warnings
overreaches its own constitutional rationale because the
prohibition protects suspects that confess voluntarily.55
Cassell's policy argument to the Court, drawn from ideas in
his own writings on the subject, was that Miranda seriously
impeded the efforts of law enforcement to apprehend and convict
criminals, and therefore, the Court should overturn the decision. 6
Under the Miranda regime, according to Cassell, police have a
more difficult time clearing crimes efficiently. 7 Often, Miranda's
requirements prevent police from clearing crimes that were easily
solvable under the previous due process regime. Since society has
an overriding interest in having crimes solved and in having
criminals rightly imprisoned, the Miranda rule is too protective of
suspects' interests, and should be altered to allow all confessions
which are voluntarily obtained58 to be admitted as evidence of the

reaches beyond the constitutional boundaries of the Fifth Amendment).
51. See id. at 7-9 (discussing cases that do not view Miranda as a

constitutional prerequisite).
52. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
53. Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at 10, Dickerson v. United
States, 120 S.Ct. 578 (2000) (No. 99-5525) (arguing that Miranda and § 3501
are consistent).

54. Id. at 1-2.
55. See id. at 12-14 (explaining that in enacting § 3501 Congress believed
that under certain circumstances voluntary confessions trigger admissibility).
56. Paul G. Cassell, Miranda'sSocial Costs:An Empirical Reassessment, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 438 (1996).

57. Id.
58. Cassell assumes a very broad definition of voluntariness which is
questionable under case law interpreting the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments before the Miranda decision. Under his definition, it seems that
only confessions which are physically compelled would be involuntary; all
other confessions would be voluntary. As the analysis in Part III of this

Article, infra, will show, this does not necessarily comport with the Court's
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defendant's guilt at trial.59
The Court rejected Cassell's arguments and held that the
Miranda doctrine must protect the Fifth Amendment rights of all
suspects in custodial interrogations." In an opinion authored by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court plainly stated that the
Miranda doctrine, in its current form, was a constitutional
requirement. 61 Deducing Miranda's constitutionality from the
circumstantial facts of Miranda itself, the Court declared that,
because the original decision in Miranda applied to trials in state
courts, the Warren Court considered Miranda to be a
constitutional requirement." In addition, the language used in the
Miranda opinion indicated that the Warren Court believed that it
was announcing a constitutional rule. 6' Further, the majority
rejected the argument that the language in Mirandainviting state
and federal legislatures to impose their own potentially alternative
safeguards proves that the Miranda doctrine is not
constitutionally required.64 Rather, the fact that the Warren Court
clearly stated that only alternatives which are as protective as the
Miranda rule would be acceptable shows the opposite: that the
Miranda rule is a clearly constitutional standard.6" Finally, the
majority dismissed the argument that the Court's willingness to
limit the protections offered by Miranda in subsequent cases
proves that the Miranda doctrine is not a constitutional
requirement.6 6 Noting that subsequent cases have also broadened
Miranda'sprotections, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "[tihese
decisions illustrate the principle-not that Miranda is not a
constitutional rule-but that no constitutional rule is
immutable." 7 Thus, the Dickerson majority clearly laid to rest the
notion that the Miranda doctrine is not rooted in the Constitution.
After first deciding the issue of Miranda's constitutionality,
the Court then addressed whether § 3501 was an alternative that
was at least as protective as the Miranda rule.6" With fairly
limited discussion, the Court rejected outright Cassell's argument

pre-Miranda interpretations of the Fifth Amendment.

59. See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at 40-49, Dickerson v.
United States, 120 S.Ct. 578 (2000) (No. 99-5525) (arguing that the
irrebuttable presumption set forth in Miranda should be rebuttable if the
confession is voluntary).
60. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2335 (2000)
(denouncing the amicus' views).
61. Id. at 2334.
62. Id. at 2333.
63. Id. at 2334.
64. Id.
65. 120 S.Ct. at 2334.

66. Id. at 2334-35.
67. Id. at 2335.
68. Id.
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that the due process standard which § 3501 would reinstate would
be at least as protective as the Miranda doctrine.69 Accordingly,
the Court struck down § 3501 as unconstitutional, and reversed
the Fourth Circuit. 0
In his dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, railed
against the majority's decision, claiming it was an example of
judicial overreaching violative of the separation of powers required
by the Constitution.7' The main rationale behind Justice Scalia's
attack is that, while the majority upheld the Miranda doctrine as
constitutionally required, it also upheld all subsequent
modifications of the doctrine, including those which allow
confessions obtained in violation of Miranda to be admitted
against a defendant at trial.2 Justice Scalia cited subsequent
cases holding that confessions which violate Miranda are
nonetheless admissible in some capacity at trial as necessarily
supporting the proposition that "it is possible-indeed not
uncommon-for the police to violate Miranda without also
violating the Constitution."7 3 From this, Justice Scalia concluded
that it is logically impossible for the majority to be able to uphold
Miranda as constitutionally required without overruling most of
the subsequent modifications to its rule.74 Yet, in order to comport
with the requirements for overturning a Congressional statute on
Constitutional grounds, the Court must find Congress in violation
of a clear constitutional principle. Since the majority declined to
transform the current Miranda doctrine into a straightforward
prohibition against the admissibility of all confessions obtained in
violation of its rule, the Court overreached its own power in
striking down § 3501 as unconstitutional. 9
Putting aside discussions of the constitutional basis for the
Court's rule in Miranda, the Dickerson case provides an
opportunity to step back and examine the realities of the Miranda
doctrine. The Miranda majority replaced the due process standard
with Miranda warnings by implicitly asserting that the Fifth
Amendment required more protection to be given to suspects
during custodial interrogation than the due process standard

69. Id.
70. 120 S.Ct. at 2335.
71. Id. at 2337.
72. Id. at 2334. For example, under the current doctrine, statements
obtained in violation of Miranda are admissible to impeach the defendant if he
takes the stand at trial, and information (or "fruits") obtained as a result of a
Miranda violation are also admissible against the defendant at trial. Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314
(1985).
73. Dickerson, 120 S.Ct. at 2340.
74. Id. at 2342.
75. Id.
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offered. 0 In passing § 3501, Congress put forth the due process
standard as its preferred alternative to the Miranda doctrine. The
majority in Dickerson rejected the due process standard as a viable
alternative almost out-of-hand, choosing to adhere to the view
which prompted the Warren Court to require the Miranda
warnings in the first instance." In this context, the question to be
asked is whether the Warren Court, and now the Rehnquist Court,
was correct in assuming that the Miranda rule offers more
protection to suspects than the due process standard. How much
protection does the Mirandadoctrine offer suspects in practice? If
Miranda offers suspects a better opportunity to exercise their
selfstate-compelled
against
rights
Fifth
Amendment
incrimination than they had under the due process standard, then
the doctrine has at least achieved one of the goals set forth in the
Miranda opinion. If it does not, then it can be concluded that the
Miranda doctrine has failed to achieve even the barest minimum
of its objectives, and the way is paved for the institution of
alternatives to Miranda.
II. THE

EMPIRICAL EFFECTS OF MIRANDA ON SUSPECTS, LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

When the Court decided Miranda in 1966, it caused an uproar
in the law enforcement community. Many individuals, including
legislators and police officers, felt that Miranda would do nothing
but impede efforts to put criminals in jail. Indeed, Congress
demonstrated its disapproval of the Miranda decision in § 3501,
8
The intensity of the
passed only two years after Miranda."
arguments surrounding Miranda prompted a number of empirical
studies to be conducted between 1966 and 1972.'9 These studies
attempted to assess, through observation of police activity, the
impact of Miranda on police conduct and on custodial
interrogations. For the most part, the studies concluded that,
after an initial phase-in period, police generally complied with the
letter, but not the spirit, of Miranda.0 They found that despite
76. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
77. Dickerson, 120 S.Ct. at 2335.
78. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (b).
79. See Leo, supra note 3, at 631 n.72 (listing the empirical studies
conducted during the eight years after Miranda was decided). Paul Cassell reanalyzed the data from a number of these studies and found that, contrary to
the views of many contemporary commentators, the studies supported the
conclusion that Miranda did have an impact on confession rates. Cassell,
supra note 56, at 395-418. Cassell's reassessment will be discussed in Part II,
infra.

80. Leo, supra note 3, at 632. This conclusion, drawn by many of the
earlier studies, assumes that the rationale behind the Mirandawarnings was
to counteract the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogations.
Although the Miranda opinion itself seems to allude to this rationale, some
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receiving the warnings, most suspects waived their Miranda
rights and to that extent the rule had only a marginal effect on the
ability of police to elicit confessions. 8' Ultimately, they concluded
that Miranda had no significant impact on rates of apprehension
or conviction of criminal suspects.
There was no additional empirical research on the impact of
Miranda on law enforcement efforts to apprehend and convict
criminals from 1973 until the 1990s. During the 1970s and 1980s,
the Miranda debate died down considerably, and generally
centered around legal theory and philosophy, rather than
empirical statistics.
Most commentators assumed that the
impact of Miranda on law enforcement was negligible, and that
whatever impact that existed was minimized by the Supreme
Court's subsequent decisions permitting the use of confession
evidence obtained in violation of Miranda against defendants at
trial.
In the 1990s a series of articles revived the empirical debate.
In 1996, both Paul Cassell and Richard Leo published articles
containing new data and new conclusions regarding the Miranda
rule's impact on confession rates and police conduct." With their
improved methodology and data collection techniques, these
studies re-opened the empirical debate as to the quantifiable
effects of Miranda on law enforcement. Throughout the decade,
additional studies were conducted and their results were
published."
Despite improved data collection techniques and statistical
analysis, the recent studies have proved inconclusive in the
aggregate for a number of reasons. First, as studies of human
behavior within the criminal justice system, much of the data is
difficult to categorize accurately because the categorization process
itself is subjective. In addition, the subject matter (i.e., arrests
and interrogations) is not replicable in a laboratory under "control"
conditions; thus, there are an unquantifiable number of variables,

commentators disagree with that interpretation of the decision. Id. at 648-50;
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
81. Leo, supra note 3, at 632.

82. Id.
83. (obtaining cite from author)
84. See generally Leo, supra note 15; Cassell, supra note 56.
85. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A
Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998) (analyzing Miranda's effects on crime clearance
rates in the U.S.). See also Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15 (analyzing the
frequency and importance of confession rates in prosecutions); Leo, supra note
15 (quantifying and analyzing patterns in police techniques, suspect behavior
and interrogation outcomes); Leo & White, supra note 14 (stating that a study
of the quantifiable effects of Miranda is impossible but analyzing how law
enforcement seeks to work around Miranda).
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many of them not directly apparent to the impartial observer,
which play a significant role in the data obtained, and which
cannot be distilled from the data collected. Another problem is
that each study contains a small sample of suspects and cases,
from which it is difficult to obtain figures of any statistical
significance. Further, the authors in each study, all of whom are
professors, were necessarily present during the data collection
process, which clearly could have influenced the conduct of the
police officers being observed. Finally, although each study clearly
sets forth the methodology used in collecting and analyzing the
data, no two studies use exactly the same methodology. This lack
of harmonization makes comparisons of results across studies
difficult, and impossible to perform in a truly accurate manner.8 6
The only way to accurately assess the current effect of
Miranda on law enforcement would be to conduct a nation-wide
study, using the same data collection and analytical techniques for
all areas observed.
The resources and cooperation between
carry
out such a project do not seem to be
scholars necessary to
available, so the best alternative in attempting to assess the
empirical impact of Miranda is to glean the relevant findings of
each study and try to construct out of those findings how Miranda
has impacted law enforcement efforts nationally.
This Part will proceed in four sections. The first section will
attempt to assess the effects of Miranda on police conduct through
both an examination of actual interrogation methods as observed
by authors of empirical studies, and an examination of the
interrogation methods set forth in police training materials. In
the second section, Miranda's impact on confession rates will be
explored through a discussion of the empirical data on suspects'
invocation of their Miranda rights before and during questioning.
The competing analyses of confession rates before and after the
Miranda decision will also be dealt with. The third section will
assess Miranda's impact on criminal adjudication through an
examination of the limited data available regarding the
importance of confession evidence to a defendant's conviction.
Finally, in the fourth section, some general conclusions will be
made about the findings of the recent studies, and ultimately
about what those findings indicate about the effectiveness of the
Miranda doctrine overall.

86. It should be noted that, even if the current studies contained
comparable data, it would be impossible to assess the impact of Miranda
across decades by comparing the recently-collected data with the data
collected between 1966 and 1972. This is because the methodology employed
in the earlier studies was not only different from that used in the recent
studies, but was also not completely and accurately recorded in each study.
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A. The Effects of Miranda on Police Conduct
Although commentators agree that it took at least four years
after Miranda was decided for police departments around the
country to implement its rules as operating procedure, since 1970,
87 The
police seem to have been following the letter of Miranda.
current studies found that police routinely read suspects the
Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation.88 However,
while police are following the letter of Miranda, it is clear that
they are not following the spirit of the decision. All studies found
that police had developed sophisticated techniques and strategies
for extracting confessions within the bounds of the Miranda
doctrine.
Modern police departments have developed a series of
strategies designed to minimize the impact of the Miranda
warnings in an attempt to induce suspects to waive their Miranda
rights.89
Some of the more straightforward minimization
strategies used include: calling attention to the formality of the
warnings, implying that they are simply bureaucratic
requirements and therefore unimportant; referring to the
warnings' dissemination in popular American television shows; ° or
blending the warnings into the conversation.9' Police also use
more sophisticated psychological strategies to minimize the
warnings' importance in the mind of a suspect. For example, an
officer seeking to minimize the warnings effect might focus the
suspect's attention on the importance of telling his story to the
interrogator (which the suspect can do only if he waives his rights
under Miranda), or might create the appearance of a nonadversarial relationship between the interrogator and the suspect,
in which the interrogator is the suspect's friend or guardian whose
goal is not
to obtain incriminating statements, but to help the
92
suspect.

87. Leo, supra note 3, at 632.
88. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 887-88; Leo, supra note 15, at 276.

Indeed, Cassell & Hayman found only three Miranda violations in all of the
interrogations he observed, and Leo found only four questionable violations,
two of which did not result in charges filed against the suspect, and one of
which did not result in an incriminating statement from the suspect. Cassell
& Hayman, supra note 15, at 889; Leo, supra note 15, at 283.
89. See Leo & White, supra note 14, at 432 (discussing the various methods
interrogators use to obtain Mirandawaivers).
90. Some commentators have argued that the portrayal of the Miranda
requirements on television police dramas, such as NYPD Blue, gives suspects

an incorrect idea of what their rights are, because the officers in such dramas
violate Miranda in almost every interrogation portrayed. See Susan Bandes &
Jack Beermann, LAWYERING UP, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 5 (1998) (examining what
the American public has learned about Mirandarights from television).
91. Leo & White, supra note 14, at 433.
92. See id. at 435-36, 439 (discussing various methods of de-emphasizing
the Miranda warnings).
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Although minimization is the strategy most commonly used
by police when reading suspects the Mirandawarnings, police also
engage in the practice of offering benefits to suspects in exchange
for a Miranda waiver.93 Implicit benefits are the most commonly
offered; police employing this strategy often act as if they want to
befriend the suspect. Some officers employing this strategy tell
the suspect that, although they want to believe that the suspect is
a good person, they cannot unless the suspect tells them his
version of exactly what happened. ' The implicit benefit in such a
scenario is the assistance of the officer who offers his friendship
and support. Police also offer explicit benefits to convince suspects
to waive their Miranda rights. When explicit benefits are offered,
they usually involve matters over which the police have no
jurisdiction or control.95 Examples of promises of explicit benefits
offered by police to elicit Miranda waivers from suspects include:
that police will obtain more lenient treatment for the suspect in
exchange for his waiver; 6 that the suspect's charges will be
dropped or diminished if he waives his Miranda rights;97 or that
police will obtain psychological (or other) treatment for the suspect
if he gives a statement.98
Successful implementation of these strategies may be one
reason why as many as 84% of suspects choose to waive their
Miranda rights at the initial stages of an interrogation.99 These
strategies may also be responsible for the low percentage of
suspects who choose to invoke their rights during questioning. In
his study of interrogations in Berkeley, California, Leo found that
only 1.1% of suspects eventually invoke their right to silence or to
counsel after initially consenting to custodial questioning. 100
Similarly, in their study of interrogations in Salt Lake County,
Cassell and Hayman found that only 4% of suspects chose to
invoke their rights during custodial questioning. 0'
Police also attempt to avoid reading the warnings altogether
by using tactics permitted under Supreme Court cases creating
exceptions to the Miranda rule. In their study of Salt Lake
County, Cassell and Hayman found that police used non-custodial
interrogation wherever possible to avoid having to read the
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 440.
Id. at 441-43.
See id. at 444-46.
See Leo & White, supra note 14, at 444.
See id. at 444-45.
See id. at 446.
See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 860.

Leo's study of

interrogations in Berkeley, California found that 78% of suspects chose to
waive at the outset of or shortly into an interrogation. See Leo, supra note 15,

at 286.
100. See Leo, supra note 15, at 275.
101. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 859.
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Miranda warnings before questioning a suspect."'
Another
strategy used by police is to question suspects regardless of
whether they waived their rights under Miranda. Police
departments employing this strategy call it questioning "outside
Miranda," and it includes any interrogation conducted without
reading the Miranda warnings to a suspect at the outset, or any
interrogation in which police continue questioning after a suspect
invokes his right to silence or to counsel.' 1 Police training videos
instruct officers to question "outside Miranda"in situations where
the officer thinks that he only has one chance to obtain an
admission from the suspect. 104 Interrogating officers attempting to
question a suspect "outside Miranda" usually do so by first
convincing the suspect that any statement he makes cannot be
used against him in court for any purpose.0 ° When the suspect
indicates that he understands that his statements are now "off the
record," as it were, the officer continues questioning within the
broad confines of the due process standard, until the suspect
confesses.1 0 6 Although neither Cassell and Hayman's study nor
Leo's study observed instances in which suspects were custodially
questioned without having been read the Mirandawarnings, court
decisions from forty-one states report circumstances in which
police engaged in questioning "outside Miranda."'°7
In sum, recent studies show that, as a general matter, police

102. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 881. Leo also observed instances
of non-custodial interrogations in his study of Berkeley, California. See Leo,
supra note 15, at 275. This tactic is completely legal under California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983), and related cases. See Part III.B, infra.
103. See Leo & White, supra note 14, at 460-61; See also Charles D.
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda,84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 133 (1998).
104. See Weisselberg, supra note 103, at 135. It should be noted that
questioning "outside Miranda" would be ultimately governed by the due
process standard. Leo & White, supra note 14, at 437. In order for any
statements obtained in violation of Miranda to be used for purposes other
than in the prosecution's case in chief, the statements still have to be
.voluntarily" given within the meaning of cases establishing the due process
standard. Id. at 458. Under this standard, neither trickery, nor lengthy
questioning, nor repeated denial of a suspect's request to confer with counsel
have been sufficient by themselves to render a suspect's statement
inadmissible for impeachment purposes. Id.
105. See Part III.B, infra (stating that under the Harris line of cases,
statements obtained in violation of Miranda can be used as impeachment
evidence against a defendant at trial, and after Elstad, evidence obtained as a
result of a Mirandaviolation can be used against the defendant at trial).
106. See Leo & White, supra note 14, at 448 (acknowledging that
interrogators who take this approach inform the suspect that they are
questioning despite his invoking Mirandarights, but suggest the answers will
stand "outside Miranda"and cannot be used against him).
107. See Weisselberg, supra note 103, at 137 (combining three jurisdiction
where officers deliberately violated Miranda with thirty-eight jurisdictions
that reported continued questioning after invocation).
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follow the letter of the Miranda decision. Most suspects are read
the Miranda warnings before being custodially questioned.
However, police have developed extremely sophisticated strategies
for extracting confessions from suspects within the constraints of
Miranda."0' The successful implementation of strategies to solicit
valid waivers of Miranda has most likely had a very significant
influence on the high rate at which suspects waive their Miranda
rights. Further, the findings show that some of the exceptions to
the Miranda doctrine have had an effect on police conduct. The
increased tendency of police to question suspects in non-custodial
settings demonstrates that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
California v. Behelerl" and similar cases, that Miranda warnings
need not be read to suspects questioned in "non-custodial"
settings, has impacted police behavior to some extent. Similarly,
the increasing prevalence of questioning "outside Miranda"
indicates that the exceptions to Miranda'sprohibition against the
admissibility of confessions obtained in the absence of any
Miranda warnings, created in cases such as Oregon v.Elstad..°
and Harris v. New York,"' also have had some effect on police
conduct.
B. The Impact of Miranda on Confession Rates
Most commentators view confession rates as the most
relevant indicator in examining the effects of Miranda on law
enforcement. Accordingly, the findings of recent empirical studies
regarding Miranda'simpact on confession rates have met with the
most controversy in the scholarly community and have been the
least consistent across Miranda-related studies."2 Despite the

108. This should come as no surprise. As early as 1959, the Supreme Court

recognized the increasing level of sophistication of police interrogation
strategies. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959) (stating that "the
methods used [by law enforcement officers] to extract confessions [are
becoming] more sophisticated").
109. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983). See Part III.B infra (discussing the holding in
Beheler, as well as an examination of the exceptions to the Mirandadoctrine).
110. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). See Part III.B, infra (discussing the holding in
Elstad,as well as an examination of the exceptions to the Mirandadoctrine).
111. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
112. Every recent empirical study asserting a statistical finding of Miranda's
impact on confession rates has met with dissent from others in the scholarly
community. For example, one such discussion took place in a series of articles
between Paul Cassell, George Thomas, and Richard Leo. See Cassell &
Hayman, supra note 15, (re-analyzing the findings in Leo, Inside the
Interrogation Room); George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About the Miranda
Debate: A "Steady-State" Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933 (1996)

(disagreeing with Cassell's characterization of Leo's results, and finding fault
with Cassell's data). Another such discussion took place between Paul Cassell
and Stephen Schulhofer. See Cassell, supra note 56, at 418 (asserting a 16.1%
drop in confession rate after Miranda); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's
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intense disagreement between the studies' authors and the
inconsistencies between their findings, a discussion of confession
rates is necessary to any empirical assessment of the Miranda
decision. If Miranda impacts any quantifiable element in the
criminal justice system, it should impact confession rates, since
the holding imposed a bright-line rule requiring a certain level of
police conduct, in place of the flexible and more permissive due
process standard. Accordingly, an analysis of confession rates
from 1966 through the present should answer the question
whether the Miranda rule was more restrictive of police behavior,
and if so, by how much.
Within the first eight years after Miranda was decided, a
number of studies attempting to assess the impact of Miranda on
the criminal justice system were conducted around the country. In
1996, Paul Cassell re-interpreted these studies, and found that,
after Miranda was decided, the confession rate dropped an
average of 16% across the country."' Cassell calculated the preMiranda confession rate, based on estimations and on data from
earlier studies, to be around 60%."' From these statistics, Cassell
concluded that Miranda had a severely negative impact on the
ability of law enforcement to apprehend and ultimately secure
convictions of criminals."' A number of commentators have
disagreed with Cassell's interpretations of the earlier studies,
most notably Steven Schulhofer and Richard Leo, both of whom
point out problems with Cassell's methodology and with the data
itself." 6 However, all agree that the data from the studies done
Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Low Social Costs, 90
Nw. U. L. REv. 500, 545 (1996) (re-analyzing Cassell's data and arguing that
the average drop was 4.1%).
113. See Cassell, supra note 56, at 446.
114. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 85, at 1062 ("Although broad
generalizations are hazardous, before-Miranda confession rates in this
country were probably somewhere around 55-60%").
115. See Cassell, supra note 56, at 438 (arguing from the confession rate

drop that the Miranda rule results in lost convictions of 3.8% of all criminal
suspects questioned in America each year).
116. See Schulhofer, supra note 112, at 112 (arguing that, after including all

of the relevant studies in this area, which Cassell did not do, and after making
adjustments for the over-representation of urban areas in the data and for
other developments independent of Miranda which could have an impact on
confession rates, the average drop in the confession rate attributable to
Miranda is only 4.1%). See Leo, supra note 3, at 633-45 (arguing that
Cassell's conclusions are not compelled from the data reported in the old
studies). Richard Leo re-interpreted the data from the earlier studies and
came to six conclusions. Id. at 645. First, from 1966-1969, American police
complied with the Miranda requirements. Id. Second, despite receiving the
warnings, most suspects waived their rights. Id. Third, once waiver of
Miranda was obtained, tactics and techniques of interrogation did not change
because of Miranda. Id. Fourth, suspects still continue to provide detectives

with confessions and incriminating statements, but in some studies at a lower
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within the first decade after Miranda was decided show that
Miranda had some effect on confession rates, whether significant,
as Cassell claims, or negligible, as Leo and Schulhofer argue."7
The findings of recent studies reporting data for confession
rates have also differed, one from another. In his study of
interrogation Salt Lake County, Cassell found that only 33% of the
interrogations he observed were successful in eliciting an
incriminating statement from the suspect."8 By contrast, in his
study of interrogations in Berkeley, California, Leo found that
64.29% of the interrogations he observed were successful." 9 It is
worth noting that, in Cassell's study, 21% of all suspects were not
subjected to any questioning, a fact which, according to some
commentators, skews his findings considerably. 0 There are other
factors which may account for the difference in the confession
rates reported in the two studies. For instance, Leo only observed
interviews conducted by detectives, whereas Cassell observed
interrogations conducted by all police officers, including rookies.
Also, Leo observed only custodial interrogations, whereas Cassell
included all interviews he observed, including non-custodial ones,
in his data."' The confession rates reported by Leo and Cassell,
therefore, may not be reasonably comparable."'
Given the impossibility of collecting data for the immediate
post-Mirandaperiod, and the logistical difficulties of observing the
police practices of a large number of jurisdictions in one study,

rate than before Miranda. Id. Fifth, clearance and conviction rates were not
significantly affected by Miranda, although in a few studies, conviction rates
were found to have dropped. Id. Sixth, Miranda may have been responsible
for lessening the effectiveness of the police in collateral functions of an
interrogation, such as obtaining the names of accomplices, clearing other
crimes, and recovering stolen property; however, Miranda does not appear to
have undermined the effectiveness of criminal investigations in the way that
the law enforcement community had feared when Mirandawas decided. Id.
117. See generally Cassell, supra note 56; Leo, supra note 3; Schulhofer,
supra note 112.
118. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 868.
119. See Leo, supra note 15, at 280 (postulating that 64% were successful if
success is defined as the gain of any incriminating evidence by a detective).
120. See Thomas, supra note 112, at 946 n.54 (noting that the percentage
included suspects whose whereabouts were unknown and that if they were
removed from the sample, the interrogation rate jumps to 84.3%).
121. See Cassell and Hayman, supra note 15, at 902 (finding that more
experienced detectives were more successful interrogators than less
experienced officers).
122. See id. at 876 (arguing that the figures are comparable, and that Leo's
figures are inflated). Thomas also argue that the rate Leo calculated is more
in line with the result of past studies. Id. But see Thomas, supra note 112, at
953-54 (asserting that the comparisons between the two figures and the
resulting downward adjustment made to Leo's figure by Cassell was
improperly done). Additionally, Thomas asserts that the confession rate in
Cassell and Hayman's Salt Lake County study was higher than reported. Id.
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some commentators have turned to clearance rates"' as an
indicator of Miranda's impact on confession rates. In 1998, Paul
Cassell and Richard Fowles obtained nationwide clearance rate
data for the period between 1966 and 1998 from the FBI and
compiled it in an attempt to discern the effect of Miranda on
clearance rates. 12 4

Cassell and Fowles found that although

clearance rates dropped between 1966 and 1970, they have
remained stable since 1970.12' After running a regression analysis,
they found that Miranda had an effect on clearance rates for
robbery, larceny, vehicle theft, and burglary, but not on rates for
homicide, rape or assault. 26 Based on these findings, the authors
conclude that Miranda's requirements adversely affected the
ability of police to obtain confessions from suspects and ultimately
solve crimes."'
As with the confession rate studies, many commentators have
disagreed with Cassell and Fowles' clearance rate conclusions.
Some have argued that a decline in clearance rates could be
attributed to a number of factors other than Miranda, such as the
coinciding deterioration of police-citizen relations in the 1960s and
1970s, changing patterns in commission of certain types of crimes,
and improved police professionalism, which reduced the artificial
inflation of clearance rates.12
Further, the accuracy of FBI
clearance rate data is notoriously suspect-a fact which Cassell
and Fowles admit, but which they seem to do little (if anything) to
correct. 12' Finally, the use of clearance rates instead of confession
rates as an indicator of Miranda's effects on law enforcement is
questionable because confessions are not necessary to the solution
of every crime. Cassell and Fowles admit as much when they

123. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 85, at 1059 (defining clearance rates
as "the rate at which police declare crimes solved"). The authors argue that
clearance rates can act as a proxy for confession rates in discerning the effects

of Miranda on law enforcement because confession evidence is often the most
crucial piece of information used by police to solve crimes. Id. at 1063.

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1074.
1068.
1089.
1126.

128. See generally John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police
Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (1998). See Cassell & Fowles, supra note
85, at 1116 (noting that some commentators have disagreed with the

conclusions drawn from the clearance rate data).
129. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 85, at 1075 n.95 (recognizing that
reporting problems across jurisdictions, as well as tendencies of departments
to inflate their numbers, and the number of subjective judgments necessary to
the reporting process, could impact the accuracy of the clearance rate data).
The authors assert that these objections did not affect their study because it
examined the data in the aggregate, therefore minimizing inaccuracy
problems. Id. at 1076. This is an unsatisfying justification, especially in the
context of an empirical study.
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assert, as a possible explanation for why they found no Miranda
effect on the clearance rates for homicide, that police could have
shifted their resources away from solving less serious crimes
towards solving homicides.' ° If this is so, then Cassell and Fowles
seem to admit that confessions are necessary insofar as they are a
shortcut used by police to investigate crimes, as opposed to
information that police need to solve crimes. 3' This means that a
decline in clearance rates could be attributable to a decline in the
use of other investigative techniques rather than a decline in the
confession rate,. 2 or to other legal restraints on police conduct,
such as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, rather than to
Miranda itself.
To summarize, recent empirical studies attempting to assess
the impact of Miranda on confession rates have proved
inconclusive and controversial. At base, all commentators would
agree that Miranda has resulted in some lost confessions.
However, whether the number of confessions lost due to the
Miranda doctrine is negligible or significant is still a matter of
debate.
C. The Impact of Miranda on CriminalAdjudication
The available empirical evidence regarding the use of
confession evidence in criminal trials supports what many
practitioners and judges in the criminal justice system already
know: confession evidence is extremely prejudicial to the
defendant's case. Studies of psychological reactions to confession
evidence have shown that such evidence substantially biases the
trier of fact's evaluation of the case in favor of conviction. 133 In
fact, confession evidence is so persuasive that conviction results in
the vast majority of cases in which such evidence is presented
against the defendant, even in cases where the confession is not
corroborated by other physical evidence."4
130. Id. at 1090.
131. Undoubtedly, confessions are necessary to solve certain crimes.
However, this does not detract from my point that, contrary to Cassell and
Fowles' apparent position, confessions are not absolutely necessary to solve
most crimes.
132. A police department's lack of funds, for example, could explain a decline
in the use of certain types of investigative techniques.
133. See Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Confession Evidence,
in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFESSION EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 67, 67-

68 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, eds., 1985).
134. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriagesof Justice in the Age of
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 494 (1998).
In the case of false confessions, Leo and Ofshe found that, because criminal

justice officials and jurors treat confession evidence with such deference, the
inferences of guilt caused by a defendant's false confession often outweighs

strong circumstantial evidence of a defendant's innocence. Id.
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Richard Leo was able to quantify this prejudicial effect in his
study of interrogations in Berkeley. Leo tracked the suspects he
observed through the case-processing stage of the criminal justice
system.'
He found that suspects who incriminated themselves
during interrogation were 20% more likely to be charged with a
crime, 24% less likely to have their cases dismissed, 25% more
likely to plea bargain, and 26% more likely to be found guilty than
those who did not self-incriminate.' 36
In their study of
interrogations in Salt Lake County, Cassell and Hayman did not
calculate percentages for the same categories, but did find that
78.9% of defendants who made incriminating statements during
questioning were convicted, whereas only 56.7% of defendants who
did not make incriminating statements were ultimately
convicted. 3 ' In other words, Cassell and Hayman found that
suspects who confessed were more likely to 1be
38 convicted, and of
more serious charges, than those who did not.
Although confession evidence is clearly prejudicial to
defendants, it may not be necessary to obtain a conviction in every
case.
An assessment of Miranda's impact on criminal
adjudications therefore requires an examination of the necessity of
confession evidence to criminal convictions. It is worth noting that
the determination whether confession evidence is necessary to
convict a defendant in a particular case is ultimately a subjective
one.13 9 It is therefore impossible to accurately quantify the
necessity of confessions to criminal convictions. However, some
attempts at estimating the importance of confessions to criminal
trials have been made. The empirical studies conducted between
1966 and 1972 attempted to assess the importance of confessions
in obtaining convictions. " ° According to Cassell's re-analysis of
their findings, confession evidence is crucial to obtaining
convictions in somewhere between 10.3% and 29.3% of all cases.'
However, it should be noted that Cassell excluded a number of
studies from his calculus, including his own recently-conducted
42
study (discussed infra), which supports a different conclusion.
The only recent attempt to assess the importance of
confession evidence to criminal adjudication was made in the Salt

135. Leo, supra note 15, at 268.
136. Id. at 298-99.
137. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 914.
138. Id. at 909.
139. Cassell, supra note 56, at 423.
140. See id. at 424-33 (providing a more thorough examination of the
assessments of the earlier studies as to the importance of confession evidence
to convicting defendants).

141. Id. at 433.
142. Id.; See also Schulhofer, supra note 112, at 502 (pointing out flaws in
Cassell's methodology).
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Lake County study conducted by Cassell and Hayman. " 3 They
calculated percentages for prosecutorial case-screening, a
procedure which requires prosecutors to assess whether the state
has enough evidence with which to proceed against the defendant.
In Salt Lake County, prosecutors filed charges in 87.5% of cases in
which an incriminating statement was elicited from the suspect,
as opposed to 81% of cases in which no incriminating statement
was obtained."' Unfortunately, these figures are inconclusive.
Although the failure to obtain a confession seems to account for a
6.5% decrease in the likelihood of filing charges, prosecutors also
failed to charge suspects in 12.5% of cases in which an
incriminating statement was obtained from the defendant. Since
the percentage for cases in which a prosecutor had a statement
from the defendant but could not file charges is almost one and
one half times that for cases in which prosecutors did not have a
statement and could not file charges, it is impossible to draw any
conclusion about the necessity of confession evidence to convicting
defendants.
Plea-bargaining is another area in which the importance of
confession evidence should be assessed. The vast majority of
criminal cases in America today are resolved by a guilty plea
rather than a trial; in fact, between 70% and 90% of all felony
cases in most jurisdictions are resolved by a plea of guilty or its
functional equivalent. " 5 Because the plea for which the defendant
negotiates depends on the strength of the state's case against him,
Cassell argues that the effects of confession evidence on plea
bargaining is an indicator of the impact of Miranda on criminal
adjudications. "6 Cassell asserts that two of the studies conducted
immediately after the Miranda decision 7 found that the presence

143. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 905-06. The authors first
attempted to assess the necessity of confessions by collecting fifty-nine cases in
which incriminating statements had been elicited from suspects, showing the
cases to prosecutors, and asking them whether those statements were

necessary to obtain a conviction.

Id. at 906.

In thirty-six of the cases,

prosecutors thought that the confessions were necessary; in twenty-three of
them, prosecutors thought the statements were unnecessary. Id. This led
Cassell and Hayman to conclude that, in 61% of cases, prosecutors need

confessions in order to obtain a conviction. Id. However, the data that Cassell
and Hayman collected on actual prosecutorial case-screening contradicts this
result. Id. at 908. Since the data on case-screening is actual data, rather than
the solicited opinions of prosecutors, I consider it a more accurate finding and

accordingly discuss it in the body of this Article.
144. Id. at 908.
145. Cassell, supra note 56, at 440-41.

146. See id. at 441-42.
147. The studies Cassell cites are David Neubauer's study of confessions in
"Prairie City," a pseudonym for a medium-sized city in central Illinois, and the
Yale Project, which studied the impact of Miranda on police conduct in New
Haven, Connecticut. Id. Cassell also notes that a 1988 study of plea
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or absence of confession evidence had a definite effect on the
outcomes of the plea bargaining process.148 Cassell and Hayman's
1994 study of Salt Lake County found that defendants who
confessed were less likely to receive concessions in plea
bargaining, and were less likely to have their charges dropped. 49
In his study of Berkeley, California, Leo found that suspects who
made incriminating statements were 24% less likely to have their
cases dismissed, and 25% more likely to have their cases resolved
by plea bargaining. 5 ' From this data, it is clear that confession
evidence strengthens the state's case against the defendant, and
thus increases both his chances of conviction and his chances of
taking a less favorable plea.
However, the evidence obtained from all of these studies does
not speak to the necessity of confession evidence to the
prosecution's case. As Schulhofer points out, Miranda can be
interpreted as having an adverse effect (on the part of the state) on
plea bargaining only if the group of cases assessed are those in
which, absent confession evidence, the state absolutely cannot
obtain a conviction."' In the studies quoted by Cassell, as well as
in that conducted by Cassell and Hayman, a confession was
counted as "necessary" any time other evidence in the case was
insufficient to make conviction likely at trial. 5 ' This is a resultoriented definition, which only looks to the outcome of each case at
trial, rather than to ultimate dispositions in the criminal justice
system. Thus, cases were counted as "lost" not only when the lack
of a confession would result in the defendant's acquittal, or in the
case being dismissed, but also when the prosecutor agreed to the
defendant's guilty plea to a reduced charge or sentence." 3 The
problem with this definition is that it fails to recognize that
prosecutors have leverage at their disposal to obtain guilty pleas
in cases otherwise considered "lost" due to lack of sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction at trial."' Although the strength of
the state's case is one factor contributing to a prosecutor's pleabargaining position, other factors, such as the higher credibility
prosecutors have with both judges and juries, the power to
increase or decrease charges, and the fact that their own liberty is
not at stake in the bargaining process (whereas the defendant's
liberty is), enable prosecutors to retain good negotiating positions
bargaining in the criminal justice system conducted by Peter Nardulli, James
Eisenstein, and Roy Flemming also found a correlation between the presence
or absence of confession evidence and plea-bargaining outcomes. Id. at 442-44.
148. See id.
149. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 911.

150. Leo, supra note 15, at 298-99.
151. See Schulhofer, supra note 112, at 542.

152. See id. at 542-43.
153. See id.

154. See id. at 543.
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in almost every plea-bargaining situation. Thus, a plea-bargained
sentence may be lower in a case without confession evidence than
in a case with confession evidence, but the case without the
confession will not be lost altogether. 55'
When the inherent
strength of the prosecutorial position in plea-bargaining is
considered, the negative effects of Miranda on plea-bargaining '6
seem non-existent, or at least not quantifiable.
In sum, the available empirical results support the conclusion
that confession evidence is extremely prejudicial to defendants at
all stages of the criminal justice system. Incriminating statements
by a defendant strengthen the prosecution's case against him, and
as such, make it more likely that he will be convicted at trial and
less likely that he will be able to secure a favorable plea. However,
the necessity of confession evidence to convict a defendant in the
As seen in Cassell and
criminal justice system is unclear.
Hayman's examination of prosecutorial screening, there does not
seem to be a direct correlation between prosecutors' decisions
whether to charge a defendant and whether or not the defendant
made an incriminating statement. '57 An empirical study seeking
specifically to isolate the importance of confessions themselves to
case dispositions in the criminal justice system is needed to
answer fully the question of Miranda's impact on criminal
adjudication.
D. Is the MirandaDoctrine Effective?
For decades, conservative and liberal commentators have
argued for the abandonment of the Miranda doctrine.
Conservatives argue that the doctrine is too restrictive of law

155. Schulhofer also points out that the plea-bargained sentence could be
judge-imposed, in which case it may not be lower than what the defendant

would have obtained at trial. Id. Further, the criminal justice system has
other mechanisms by which a defendant may be punished, even without
evidence sufficient to convict him at trial. Id. For example, if the defendant is
convicted for something else, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines require a
judge to take into account the defendant's prior conduct in imposing a

sentence for the current offense. Id. at 543-44.
156. Cassell concludes that, due to the importance of confession evidence to
the prosecution's position, Miranda has had a negative impact on the pleabargaining process from the point of view of prosecutors. Cassell, supra note
56, at 445. In this context, he does not explain why the Department of Justice,
the agency in charge of all federal prosecutors in the United States, has not
consistently supported the re-instatement of the due process standard for any
significant period of time. Indeed, the Department of Justice argued on the
side of the petitioner, Charles Dickerson, rather than the Fourth Circuit, in

the Dickerson case. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 670.
157. It should be noted that, because confessions often lead police to uncover
additional evidence against suspects, confessions might have a greater impact
than the current empirical data seem to indicate. Cassell, supra note 56, at

471-72.
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enforcement's efforts to secure the conviction of criminals. 158 On
the other hand, liberals argue that the doctrine is not sufficiently
protective of suspects' rights." 9 The availability of recentlycollected empirical data provides an opportunity to assess the
effectiveness of the Miranda doctrine in practice. What do the
empirical findings indicate about the current state of the Miranda
doctrine vis-A-vis the rights of suspects and the interests of law
enforcement?
The empirical findings support the theoretical argument that
Miranda offers more protection to suspects than due process
standard. In the studies conducted by Leo and by Cassell and
Hayman, some suspects did invoke their right to silence or counsel
during a custodial interrogation. 6 ' Both recent studies also
observed that police read the warnings to all suspects at the outset
of a custodial interrogation. 6 ' Studies of clearance and confession
rates after Miranda indicate that police have obtained fewer
confessions from suspects since Miranda was decided, although
the precise extent of this decline is still debated.'62 These basic
findings clearly indicate that Miranda has constrained somewhat
the ability of law enforcement to obtain confessions from suspects
during custodial interrogation. Insofar as the greater number of
confessions obtained in the due process regime was due to a higher
incidence of police coercion 63 in the aggregate, it is reasonable to
conclude that Miranda offers suspects more protection against
being compelled by the state to incriminate themselves than the
due process standard.
Even though Miranda has improved on the due process
standard in terms of reducing police coercion in the aggregate, the
empirical findings also uncover some problems with the Miranda
doctrine. Most troubling to an assessment of the success of the
Mirandaregime is that a high percentage of suspects-as many as
158. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 56, at 471.
159. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?
A Proposalto Mirandize Miranda,100 HARV. L. REV. 1826 (1987).

160. Leo, supra note 15, at 275-76; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 859-

60.
161. Leo, supra note 15, at 275-76; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 887.
162. See supra notes 112-132 and accompanying text.

163. Police coercion here does not refer to physical violence committed by
police against suspects to induce confessions.
As the Miranda Court
recognized, the majority of confessions obtained under the due process
standard as it existed in the 1960s were psychologically, not physically,
compelled. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966). The Miranda
warnings were designed to combat the psychologically compelling nature of

custodial interrogations. Assuming that the Miranda Court is correct in
asserting that the nature of custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, the
decrease in the number of confessions obtained under the Miranda regime
indicates that, in the aggregate, custodial interrogations are less coercive than
they were under the due process regime.
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84%--waive their rights at the outset of a custodial
interrogation." Thus, although aggregate findings indicate that
interrogations are less coercive, the vast majority of individual
suspects are not protected under the Miranda regime. This is
probably due in large part to the myriad strategies developed by
police to minimize the Miranda warnings. 6 ' In addition, the
structure of the rule itself is partially responsible for the high
waiver percentage. Since the Miranda rule does not alleviate the
secrecy of the custodial situation, on which many successful
interrogators capitalize, it does not truly combat the inherently
coercive nature of the atmosphere in the interrogation room. 66
Further, full protection of the rule does not extend without the
positive action of suspects, who, if intimidated by the custodial
surroundings, are not likely to take a proactive position and
exercise their Miranda rights.
Thus, police sophistication
combined with the structure of the rule itself has caused Miranda
to be ineffective from the point of view of the majority of suspects.
In addition, recent empirical findings show that the
exceptions made to the Miranda doctrine do have some effect on
police conduct and on the ultimate outcome of certain custodial
interrogations."'
Many modern police departments take
advantage of the exceptions to Miranda's admissibility
requirements created by the Supreme Court. Studies of current
police practice indicate that a number of police departments
advocate questioning "outside Miranda"in certain circumstances,
a policy made possible as a practical matter by the Supreme
Court's decisions in Harris and Elstad.16" Further, some police
departments have turned wherever possible to non-custodial
interrogation, in which, under the Beheler line of cases, Miranda
warnings are not required before questioning, in place of custodial
interrogation.' 9 These findings clearly indicate that police are
using some of the exceptions to the Miranda rule in attempting to
extract confessions from certain suspects. However, the effects of
the Miranda exceptions are not sweeping. It is important to note
that not all police departments are using these exceptions as a
M

164. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 860.
165. Leo & White, supra note 14, at 432.
166. Indeed, in his interrogation manual, Fred Inbau asserts that effective
interrogations owe their success to the privacy of the custodial situation.
FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 24-28 (3d
ed. 1986).
167. It should be noted that not all exceptions to the Miranda doctrine have
been found to have a discernible empirical effect. For example, use of the
Quarles exception was not observed in any of the empirical studies assessed
here.
168. Leo & White, supra note 14, at 460-61; Weisselberg, supra note 103, at
133.
169. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 881-82.
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general practice, and that departments that use the exceptions do
not do so with all suspects. Accordingly, only some of the recent
empirical studies have found that police do not read suspects the
Miranda warnings, or that police do not respect suspects'
invocations of their Miranda rights.' ° The majority of suspects,
even in precincts which engage in questioning "outside Miranda,"
are interrogated pursuant to Miranda'srequirements.
Therefore, the empirical findings show that, as a general
matter, police adhere to the core requirements of the Miranda
doctrine. The vast majority of suspects are read the Miranda
warnings before custodial interrogation begins. Yet the fact
remains that a very high percentage of suspects waive their
Miranda rights and give incriminating statements during
custodial interrogations. This data alone indicates that the
Miranda doctrine is not fulfilling the rationale set forth to
originally justify it; that is, the Miranda rule, in practice, is not
adequately combating the inherently coercive atmosphere of
custodial interrogations.
There are a number of possible reasons why suspects waive
their rights to silence and counsel in the interrogation room. The
sophisticated strategies that police have developed to induce
waiver provide one explanation. As Leo and White found, police
are trained in over fifteen different methods of reading the
Miranda warnings to suspects, many of them psychologically
compelling, which generally result in suspects waiving their
rights.'7'
These strategies are probably responsible for the
majority of Miranda waivers. An alternative explanation is that
some suspects act on their own desire to waive their rights,
thinking that, if they give a statement, they can outwit the police
and exonerate themselves. Since the Miranda protections do not
extend as a practical matter unless the suspect invokes them,
Miranda cannot protect suspects who confess in an attempt to
outsmart the police or out of personal guilt.
One further explanation for the high percentage of suspects
who waive their Miranda rights is that suspects do not
understand their rights under Miranda when they waive them,
and the standards used to determine the voluntariness of a
Miranda waiver make it difficult for a defendant to prove
involuntariness. 172 It is true that the frequent appearance of the
Miranda warnings in mass media and popular culture makes it
unlikely that suspects have never heard them before setting foot in
the interrogation room. The logical conclusion from the popularity
of the Mirandawarnings in movies and on television is that every

170. Leo, supra note 15, at 275; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 860.
171. Leo & White, supra note 14.
172. See Ogletree, supra note 159, at 1827.

2001]

Looking Beyond Miranda

suspect understands his rights under Miranda before being
custodially questioned.
However, this conclusion appears
seriously flawed in light of the fact that the Mirandarights are not
portrayed accurately on television.'73 In popular police dramas,
suspects' Miranda rights are often violated by police, who use a
range of prohibited tactics, including physical violence, to obtain
confessions from suspects.' If this is the source by which suspects
are educated about their Miranda rights, it is not necessarily clear
that they understand the substance of those rights when police
read them at the outset of a custodial interrogation. In fact, it is
likely that suspects who learn about Miranda on television
misunderstand the substantive meaning of the warnings.
The fact that so many suspects waive their rights, despite the
fact that the Miranda doctrine is followed most of the time,
necessarily calls the doctrine itself into question. Clearly, if the
underlying rationale of the Miranda doctrine is to prevent
suspects from unwittingly issuing incriminating statements to
police, then the doctrine as constructed by the Warren Court has
failed. Does the Miranda doctrine work under any rationale? In
response to this question, the justifications for Miranda advanced
in case law and in scholarship are relevant. The two most
commonly advanced grounds for the doctrine are that it was
created to combat the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial
interrogations, and that it was created to strike a balance between
the rights of suspects and the interests of law enforcement. 7 ' If
the Miranda doctrine, considered in terms of its practical effects,
satisfies either of these rationales, then it can be said to "work" in
some sense. If it does not, then an alternative must be seriously
considered.
The Supreme Court's decision in Miranda hinged largely on
its determination that custodial interrogations were inherently
coercive from the point of view of suspects.
In language
emphasizing the importance of individual free will in the Fifth
Amendment context, the Court held that custodial interrogations
conducted without informing the suspect of his constitutional
rights to silence and to counsel are coercive, "created for no
purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his

173. See Bandes and Beermann, supra note 90, at 6-7 (discussing the
portrayal of the Mirandarights on the TV program NYPD Blue).
174. Id. at 7-8.
175. It should be noted that these two rationales are not incompatible with

each other. The idea of combating the coercion inherent in the interrogation
setting is easily fit into the structure of the balancing rationale as one of the
major interests of suspects (if not the most prominent interest). In addition,
as argued briefly above, the balancing rationale was contemplated, at least
implicitly, by the Miranda majority.
See infra notes 249-320 and
accompanying text.
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examiner.' 76 Because the atmosphere of custodial interrogation
"carries its own badge of intimidation" which is at odds with
human dignity, the Court found that "[u]nless adequate protective
devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant
can truly be the product of his free choice."177 Finally, when the
Court announced its rule that the fourfold warnings must be read
to all suspects at the outset of custodial interrogation, it asserted
as its rationale that "such a warning is an absolute requirement in
overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation
atmosphere." 178 Thus, it is fair to conclude from the language of
the opinion that the Miranda Court was primarily concerned with
protecting suspects' free will in situations of custodial
interrogation. Since the Court viewed custodial interrogations as
inherently coercive to suspects, it had to construct the fourfold
warnings in order to give suspects the knowledge that, despite
being under the custodial control of the state, they were not
required to respond
in an incriminating manner to any questions
79
asked by police.'
The available evidence about Miranda's effects on the
criminal justice system shows that the Miranda rule does not
affect its rationale of combating the inherently coercive
atmosphere of custodial interrogations. The high percentage of
suspects who waive their rights when it is clearly not in their
interests to do so, and the correspondingly low percentage of
suspects who invoke their rights during an interrogation are both
indications that the custodial interrogation situation is still
inherently coercive to suspects. One reason for Miranda'sfailure
to adequately combat the coerciveness of custodial questioning is
that the Court gave suspects the power to stop the questioning.
Since the power attaches when the suspect is in custody, the rule's
protections kick in only when the suspect is isolated and
surrounded by police hostile to his interests-solely in the
inherently coercive situations which the Miranda Court was
striving to combat. 8 ' Further, Miranda'sprotections are initiated

176.
177.
178.
179.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
Id. at 457-58.
Id. at 468.
The Court did not construct this rationale out of thin air. The Supreme

Court viewed voluntariness in terms of whether the defendant's free will was
impeded by police conduct at the end of the nineteenth century. In Brain, for
example, the Court held that a detective's misrepresentation of the evidence
against the defendant, made in order to induce the defendant to confess,

rendered the confession involuntary because it negated the defendant's ability
to freely decide whether to incriminate himself. Bram v. United States, 168

U.S. 532, 562 (1897).
180. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual
Rights and Law Enforcement, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 14-15 (1988).
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by police, who, contrary to their own interests, must read the
warnings to the suspect. In order to minimize the number of
suspects who invoke their rights under Miranda, police have
devised many successful strategies by which to affect Miranda
waivers.'81 From the recent empirical evidence, it is clear that,
even excepting consideration of police who question "outside
Miranda," the Miranda rule does not work if its underlying
rationale is to combat the inherently coercive atmosphere of
custodial interrogations.
An alternative rationale given to justify Miranda is that its
rule was designed to strike a balance between the interests of
Advanced
society and the interests of individual suspects.
82
case
subsequent
as
in
as
well
itself,
the
decision
in
implicitly
83
assumes
theory
this
the
decision,"'
law. and by commentators on
that society's interests are aligned with law enforcement's
interests in apprehending and ultimately convicting criminals."'
Taking as given that the interests of society are, for the most part,
conflated with those of law enforcement, does Miranda satisfy this
rationale? In order to determine whether the Miranda doctrine
really does effect a careful balance between the interests of
suspects and the interests of law enforcement, a discussion of the
costs and benefits resulting from Miranda is necessary.
From the perspective of society and law enforcement,
Miranda confers a number of benefits. First, the Miranda rule
has been a civilizing influence on police conduct inside the
interrogation room. Although instances of physically coercive
interrogations were on the decline before Miranda was decided,
the bright-line rule imposed on police conduct seems to have sent
an effective message to police departments around the country
It
that tactics employing physical brutality will not be tolerated.'

181. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
182. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477 ("Our decision is not intended to hamper
the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime.").
183. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 434 n.4 (1986) ("As any
reading of Miranda reveals, the decision, rather than proceeding from the
premise that the rights and needs of the defendant are paramount to all
others, embodies a carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect both the
defendant's and society's interests.")
184. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 85, at 1129.

185. As a blanket assumption, this is clearly flawed. It is possible to imagine
a number of examples in which the interests of society and those of law
enforcement would diverge. The issue of searches conducted by police
provides one such example. While it would be far easier for police to
investigate crime if they could search houses of all residents at any time,
individuals would seek to prevent such conduct because their interests in
maintaining their personal space private and secure from the unreasonable
reach of government would undoubtedly outweigh their interest in reducing
the aggregate crime rate.
186. Leo, supra note 3, at 668.
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is true that the use of physical force to compel a suspect to make a
statement violates the due process standard; however, Miranda's
bright-line standard made the line between proper and improper
conduct clear for all police officers. Accordingly, since Miranda
was decided, incidences of physical coercion during interrogations
have decreased to the point that suppression
of confessions due to
18 7
physical coercion rarely occurs today.
Another benefit to society and to law enforcement is that
Miranda has increased the level of professionalism in police
departments across the country. Miranda established an objective
set of rules for police to follow in conducting custodial
interrogations. To some extent, this objective standard has made
it easier to hold police and their departments accountable for their
misconduct. This accountability, in turn, has lead to an increase
88
in public support for police in the decades following Miranda.'
Since public support leads to increased citizen cooperation with
police, the accountability imposed by the Mirandarule has directly
benefited police as well as society. Further, the level of training in
modern police departments has increased since the Miranda
decision, undoubtedly due to the accountability its bright-line rule
conferred. Police today receive training in evidence, criminal
procedure, and in investigatory techniques to a greater extent
than thirty years ago."' This makes police officers, as a general
rule, better at their jobs, and more respectful of individuals' rights.
A related benefit to law enforcement is that the
implementation of Miranda gave police added credibility in the
courtroom. If police read the Miranda warnings to a suspect, and
the suspect waives and makes a statement, the vast majority of
judges and juries will find that the suspect's waiver and
subsequent confession valid and admissible. This credibility,
combined with the fact that police devised sophisticated strategies
for obtaining statements in compliance with Miranda, caused
police departments to speak out in favor of Miranda in recent
190
years.
Along with the benefits it confers on society and law
enforcement, Miranda also resulted in some tangible costs which
are reflected in empirical data. Since 1966, the confession rate has
declined. 9 ' Even if the percentage decline is only 0.78%, as
Schulhofer argues, such a percentage still translates to over a
thousand criminals set free every year because Miranda impeded
police efforts to obtain enough evidence to ensure criminal

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 669.
Cassell & Fowles, supra note 85, at 1116.
Leo, supra note 3, at 670.
Id. at 671.
Supra notes 114-123 and accompanying text.
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convictions.'92
Similarly, clearance rates have declined since
1966.193 Again, even if this decline is negligible, it still accounts for
over a thousand guilty suspects going free every year because of
the restraints imposed by Miranda on police investigatory
techniques. A decline in the clearance rate also impacts the ability
of police departments to solve other crimes, because solving crimes
through confessions is far more efficient in terms of time and
resources spent on each case. If crimes which previously were
solved via confession evidence can no longer be cleared this way,
police departments must either expend more resources to solve
them, or allow those cases to go unsolved. Since confession
evidence is considered by factfinders to be the most persuasive
evidence of a defendant's guilt at trial,"" and since confessions are
a commonly-used investigatory method, the loss of confessions is a
cost of the Miranda doctrine that must be taken seriously.
From the perspective of suspects, the Miranda doctrine
confers some benefits. Compared to the due process standard,
Miranda empowers suspects to protect themselves against being
compelled by the state to confess to a crime. Under Miranda,
suspects can stop custodial questioning at any time by simply
invoking their right to silence or to counsel. Suspects are advised
of these rights before questioning begins, so that, theoretically,
they begin each interrogation from an empowered position.
Miranda gives suspects some power to control the course of a
custodial interrogation. However, as argued above, the empirical
evidence shows that this empowerment may be only theoretical.
An extremely high percentage of suspects waive their rights and
make incriminating statements, and an extremely low percentage
of suspects invoke their rights during interrogation. Thus, a very
minimal percentage of suspects actually enjoy the benefits that
Miranda confers; the vast majority of suspects never use the
power that Miranda gives them.
An additional benefit Miranda gives suspects and the public
is an increased awareness of the rights of individuals during
custodial interrogations. A national poll conducted in 1984 found
that 93% of those surveyed knew that they had a right to an
attorney if arrested, and a national poll conducted in 1991 found
that 80% of those surveyed knew that they had a right to remain

192. Schulhofer, supra note 112, at 544. See also Cassell, supra note 56, at

440 (citing estimates that the number of cases lost due to the confession rate
decline induced by Mirandais in the hundreds of thousands per year); Cassell
& Hayman, supra note 15, at 918 (concluding that Miranda imposes societal

costs by reducing confessions and prosecutorial success).
193. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 85, at 1068, 1126.
194. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL M. KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN

THE COURTROOM 102-26 (1993) (describing juror reactions to confessions based
on case studies).
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silent if arrested. 9' One common argument made about Miranda
is that the prominent use of the warnings in police dramas on
television and in films has not only made Miranda one of the most
well-known Supreme Court decisions among non-lawyers, but has
also informed the general public of their rights upon arrest.'96
Thus, the argument proceeds, even suspects who have had no
prior contact with the criminal justice system know and
understand their rights in a custodial interrogation situation.
However, if suspects and the public obtain information about
their rights in the interrogation room from television, it is likely
that they are misinformed as to the substance of those rights. As
noted above, the portrayal of suspects' rights under Miranda in
police dramas are often inaccurate. 97
During custodial
interrogations on television, police often use physical force and
other tactics which would be illegal under Miranda and the due
process standard.9
Police on television often get angry and
mistreat suspects who attempt to invoke their right to counsel in
the interrogation room, whereas they are much more pleasant to
suspects who "cooperate," and make incriminating statements.'9 9
From this, suspects learn not that they have the power to stop
custodial interrogations at any time, but that if they attempt to
invoke their Miranda rights, police will get angry with them, treat
them badly, or ignore their invocation entirely. Ironically, the
dissemination of the Miranda doctrine through popular culture
may have contributed to the high waiver percentage by gutting the
protections in the minds of suspects. 00
Although Miranda theoretically confers benefits on suspects,
empirical and other studies seem to indicate that most suspects do
not receive those benefits. In addition, confession evidence
remains the most prejudicial type of evidence a defendant could
face at trial. Confession evidence is so persuasive to factfinders
that defendants are convicted in the vast majority of cases in
195. Leo, supra note 3, at 672.
196. Id. at 671.
197. See Bandes & Beermann, supra note 90, at 6 (calling television's
portrayal of Miranda 'oversimplified").
198. See id. at 7-8 (describing N.Y.P.D. Blue episode in which officers used
physical force and ignored suspect's request for the assistance of counsel).
199. See id. at 9 (describing how N.Y.P.D. Blue "created the impression that

if the suspect cooperates," he will receive more favorable terms in his case).
200. Id. at 6. An additional complication with the argument that Miranda
has educated suspects and the public through popular culture portrayals of
police work is that it ignores how police are portrayed in popular culture. Id.
Since the 1980s, police work has tended to be portrayed heroically. Id. Police

dramas are structured so that the viewer empathizes with the officers and
feels that the suspects-portrayed as the "bad guys"-are getting what they

deserve, even when their Constitutional rights are violated. Id. at 13. This
could have implications on how suspects internalize their Mirandarights. Id.
at 14.
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which such evidence is presented, including cases in which the
confession was not corroborated (and was sometimes contradicted)
by other physical evidence.2"' Because factfinders view confessions
as such persuasive evidence of guilt, it is important that any
assessment of the costs and benefits of Miranda include the fact
that the Miranda rule has increased the credibility of confession
evidence." 2 But while it heightened the stakes against the
defendant at trial, the Miranda rule has not adequately ensured
that suspects are not psychologically pressured into waiving their
rights and making incriminating statements. In this sense, the
increased credibility of confession evidence (and of police
testimony) after Miranda can be viewed as a cost to suspects.
Therefore, the fact that, in practice, suspects do not receive
the benefits intended for them by the Miranda rule, necessitates
the conclusion that the doctrine does not work as a balance
between the interests of society or law enforcement and the
interests of suspects. From the perspective of the criminal justice
system, the fact that suspects do not seem to receive the
empowerment intended by the Miranda rule means that no group
as a whole is benefited by the costs of the rule in lower confession
rates and lower clearance rates. Arguably, Miranda struck a
"carefully crafted balance" because law enforcement receives some
benefits in exchange for losses in confession and clearance rates,
while confession evidence is still obtained in the vast majority of
cases. However, this interpretation of the balance struck by
Miranda largely ignores the interests of suspects, and is therefore
nothing more than a rhetorical sleight-of-hand. The fact remains
that police obtain some benefits in exchange for the costs of lower
clearance and confession rates, whereas suspects are not able to
realize the theoretical benefits conferred on them by the Miranda
rule in exchange for the costs of their increased chances of
conviction at trial if they give an incriminating statement. If the
objective of a rule governing the admissibility of confessions is to
balance the interests of suspects on the one hand and law
enforcement on the other, surely there is a balance that is more
efficient and more effective than Miranda from both points of
view.
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the Miranda
rule does not work under either commonly-advanced rationale. It
does not effectively combat the coercive atmosphere of custodial
interrogations, and it does not effect a true balance between the
interests of suspects and the interests of law enforcement or of
society. Thus, an alternative to the Miranda rule must be

201. Leo & Ofshe, supra note 134, at 494.
202. See Leo, supra note 3, at 671 (describing how Miranda has improved
law enforcement's image in front of the members of the judicial system).
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considered.
In 1968, Congress proposed and passed as its
alternative the reinstitution of the due process standard in §
3501.23 As previously discussed, § 3501 did include the reading of
Miranda warnings as a factor to be considered within a larger
inquiry of the "totality of the circumstances," precisely the method
of analysis used under the pre-Miranda due process standard.2 4
In Dickerson the Court declared this statute unconstitutional,
reasoning that the statute was neither as protective nor more
protective of suspects' rights than the Miranda rule.2 °0 However,
Paul Cassell has argued, both in his writings and at oral argument
in Dickerson, that the totality of the circumstances analysis set
forth in § 3501 is just as protective against the admission of
involuntary confessions as the Miranda doctrine is in practice.2 6
If this is true, then the language of the Miranda opinion itself
sanctions the implementation of § 3501 instead of the Miranda
doctrine, and the Dickerson case was wrongly decided (at least as
to the constitutionality of the statute).2 7
In its concurrent
examination of the due process standard and the Miranda
doctrine, the next section inquires as to whether Cassell's
argument is fundamentally or theoretically true.
III.

COMPARING THE DUE PROCESS STANDARD AND THE MIRANDA

DOCTRINE

The general wisdom regarding the Miranda doctrine is that it
gave suspects more protection than did the due process standard.
The Miranda Court itself seemed to assume this when it set forth
its bright-line rule, and the Dickerson Court adopted this
assumption when it rejected the notion that the due process
standard was as protective as the Miranda rule in practice. Is the
general wisdom correct? In an attempt to answer this question,
this Part analyzes both the due process standard and the Miranda
doctrine side-by-side, ending with a direct comparison of the
protections both doctrines offer suspects during custodial
interrogation.
203. 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
204. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b).

205. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2335 (2000) (holding
that § 3501 is not equally "as effective as Miranda in preventing coerced
confessions").

206. Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at 33, Dickerson, 120 S.Ct. at
2335.
207. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (stating that:
we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to

any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation
process as it is presently conducted .... We encourage Congress and the
States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways

of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient
enforcement of our criminal laws.).
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A. The Due Process Standard:Assessing Voluntariness Through
Multiple Factors
Before the Court decided Miranda in 1966, the standard by
which judges decided whether to admit a confession was the due
process standard, also known as the voluntariness standard.2 °8
Under this standard, the judge took into account a number of
factors in considering the context and conditions under which a
defendant's confession occurred to determine whether it was
"voluntary" within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. It is this standard which Congress attempted to
reinstate in 1968 with the passage of § 3501.
The due process standard's doctrinal justification was to
ensure that individuals' Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
were not infringed upon by police or by other state conduct. This
standard, developed in case law, required judges to determine on a
case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances,
whether the defendant's confession was voluntary, or not
compelled. Put another way, the central inquiry was whether the
defendant's "will was overborne" by police interrogation when he
confessed. 0 9 If the confession was found to be voluntary, then it
was deemed admissible; if it was found to be compelled, then it
was inadmissible.
Because it requires judicial inquiry to be conducted on a caseby-case basis, the due process standard does not contain any
bright-line rules.210 Instead, judges are to apply a list of factors in
analyzing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
These factors have not been articulated
confession.
simultaneously in one case, but were set forth and developed by
the Supreme Court in cases dealing with the issue over time. Five
major factors, the presence of which will tend to render a
confession involuntary, can be gleaned from the Court's decisions
208. KAMISAR, supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, for
the purposes of this Article, I use the terms "due process standard" and
"voluntariness standard" as synonymous ones, both referring to the standard
articulated by the Supreme Court to determine whether a confession is
admissible either before Miranda was decided, or after a suspect's voluntary
and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. To avoid the difficulty of
analyzing precisely what the Court meant by "voluntariness" in each case, I
approach the standard in terms of which factors the Court applies in deciding
whether a confession is admissible as part of the prosecution's case in chief.
Such an approach has been suggested by other commentators in this area.
See, e.g., KAMISAR, supra note 4, at 24-25 (suggesting the "voluntariness"

terminology could be eradicated without harm).
209. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) (stating that

"the question in each case is whether the defendant's will was overborne at the
time he confessed.").

210. It could be argued that the per se rule against confessions obtained
through physical abuse of suspects by police is a bright-line rule. However, I
discuss this as a factor. See infra Part III.A.

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:637

applying the voluntariness standard: the excessive length of the
interrogation; the presence of physical intimidation or torture; the
mental incompetence of the suspect; the presence of psychological
intimidation or of explicit promises made by the police to induce a
suspect's confession; the suspect's relative lack of knowledge about
the criminal justice system at the time of the interrogation.
Empirical studies show that only the latter three of these factors
remain relevant in the context of modern-day, post-Miranda
interrogations.2"
One factor regularly considered by courts in applying the due
process standard is the length of the interrogation. This factor
indicates compulsion if the defendant is interrogated for an
extended period of time, often in conditions which are clearly
inhumane.212 For example, the Court held confessions involuntary
in cases in which police questioned the defendant for an extended
period of time with effectively no break or sleep.213 Only truly
extended periods of time will result in the length of the
interrogation becoming a significant factor in the Court's decision
that a confession was compelled.2"4
A second factor which courts consider in assessing whether a
confession was voluntary under the due process standard is the
presence of physical intimidation or torture by police during the
interrogation. 2 5 This has been applied as a per se rule, such that
211. See, e.g., Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 892 (finding that only
one custodial interrogation in the study lasted longer than one hour); Leo,
supra note 15, at 279, 283 (finding that over 70% of the interrogations

observed lasted less than one hour, and that only 8% of the interrogations
observed lasted longer than two hours, and finding no instances of physical
coercion by police officers during interrogations).
212. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 204-08 (1960) (holding
mentally-ill defendant's confession involuntary where defendant was
interrogated for eight or nine hours in a four-by-six-foot room by three

detectives without counsel present, and where the confession he signed was
written by the interrogating officers); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 23940 (1940) (lobbying that confessions were involuntary where defendants
confessed following continuous overnight interrogation after having been held

incommunicado for several days).
213. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (holding an eight-hour

interrogation that lasted until 3 A.M. produced an involuntary confession);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (holding a five-hour interrogation of 15year old defendant inadmissible, but age of defendant, rather than length of
the interrogation, was prominent factor in analysis); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1944) (holding that a confession that arose out of a thirty-six

hour interrogation was coerced and invalid).
214. It seems that eight hours of questioning or more will result in the Court
mentioning the length of the interrogation as a factor in determining that the

defendant's will was overborne when he confessed. However, it is difficult to
determine precisely what length of time is required for a court to find that

police compelled a defendant's confession, since the Court will often not
mention the length of the confession if it is not a significant factor.
215. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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any adverse physical contact between police and a suspect is
sufficient grounds for finding the confession inadmissible.2 16 The
major case clearly establishing this factor is Brown v.
217
Mississippi,
in which the defendants were hanged by the neck
from a tree, beaten with a leather strap, and whipped until they
agreed to confess. 18 It seems that this per se prohibition against
physical violence, along with the Miranda decision, has largely
eradicated the use of physical force by police to compel suspects to
confess. Empirical data collected after Miranda was decided
indicates that physical coercion is no longer a tactic used by police
to induce confessions.219
The mental competence or intelligence of the suspect is
another factor considered in the due process analysis.2 6 If police
capitalize on a suspect's mental illness or inability to comprehend
the situation in obtaining a confession, courts are likely to find
compulsion. 221 The age and level of education of the defendant
have also been considered in assessing whether his will was
The
overborne by official pressure during the interrogation.
Court's rationale for taking age, educational level, and intelligence
into account seems to be that a suspect who does not comprehend
the nature of his interrogation may be more easily convinced that
he should confess.2 23 For the same reasons, in its pre-Mirandadue
process jurisprudence, the Court regarded a defendant's mental
216. Id. at 283.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 281-82. Brown is also the first case in which the voluntariness
standard was incorporated to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.

219. See Leo, supra note 15, at 277-78 (finding that physical compulsion was
not a tactic used by police in custodial interrogations from empirical
observations of police conduct).
220. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-01 (1948).
221. See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196-98 (1957) (holding that

the defendant's confession was not voluntary because law enforcement had
applied great pressure to an individual of low mentality, and who they knew
may have been mentally ill). The defendant in Fikes had started school at age
eight and left at sixteen, unable to pass the third grade, and there was some
evidence that he suffered from schizophrenia. Id. at 193, 196. The Court's
main concern seemed to be that, because of his lack of intelligence, the
defendant was particularly susceptible to having his will overborne by police
interrogation. Id. at 198.
222. See, e.g., Spano, 360 U.S. 315 (holding that a confession of foreign-born

defendant who was 25 years old and had not finished the ninth grade was
involuntary); Haley, 332 U.S. 596 (holding that the confession of 15-year-old
defendant who confessed after five-hour interrogation was involuntary).

223. As the Court stated in Haley:
[Wihen, as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us,
special care in scrutinizing the record must be used .... [A 15-year-old
boy] needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of
fear, then of panic.

He needs someone on whom to lean lest the

overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, may not crush him.
Haley, 332 U.S. at 599-600.
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illness to be a significant factor in rendering his confession
compelled. 4
A fourth factor considered in the due process analysis is
whether police psychologically intimidated the suspect during
custodial interrogation.2'

As early as 1897, the Supreme Court

held that if police or interrogating officials made statements
tending to induce a suspect to confess, any resulting confession
was involuntary.226 Under this standard, if police inform a suspect
that another suspect has implicated him in the crime in question,
or if police tell a suspect that it would be better for him if he just
confessed to the crime in question, any resulting confession would
be deemed involuntary and inadmissible.227 Although this rule has
not been followed in the criminal jurisprudence of the modern era,
the Court has recognized and prohibited as unduly coercive
psychological
intimidation
by police during custodial
interrogations. 2 8
Under the current standard, egregious
inducements by police are clearly prohibited. For example,
withholding basic rights from a suspect, such as the ability to call
his spouse, and then offering those rights as an inducement for the
suspect to make an incriminating statement is not permitted. 29
However, promises of services not regularly provided by police,
such as psychiatric treatment, in exchange for a statement ° have
been held to be permissible by modern courts. 2 '
224. See, e.g., Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207-08 (stating that the defendant's
mental illness is relevant to a voluntariness inquiry because an individual
with the defendant's level of mental illness could not have sufficient
"independence of will" to withstand police interrogation). This factor has been
modified in the Court's post-Miranda due process jurisprudence, so that the
mental illness of a suspect, without additional action by the police, is not
enough to render his confession involuntary. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
157, 163-64 (1986). The police must actively capitalize on the suspect's mental
state in order for the post-Miranda Court to find that his confession was made
involuntarily. Id.
225. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897).
226. Id. (asserting that the Fifth Amendment guards against confessions
that were induced by threats or promises).
227. See id. at 560-65 (noting that the defendant was both encouraged to
lessen the punishment by confessing to a crime, as well as told he was
implicated by a co-suspect).
228. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 239 (1940) (holding
defendants' confessions involuntary on the basis that the conditions in which
they were obtained were psychologically coercive; or, in the Court's words,
"were such as to fill petitioners with terror and frightful misgivings.").
229. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 504 (1963) (defendant held
incommunicado for between five and seven days; police promised that he could
call his wife and an attorney only after he made a statement regarding the
crime in question).
230. This kind of quid pro quo arrangement would be prohibited if the
modern Court followed the rule set forth in Bram. Bram, 168 U.S. at 560-65.
231. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 612-13 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding
that an implicit promise of leniency and psychiatric care was not enough to
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Although not as important or prominent a factor as the other
four discussed here, a defendant's knowledge of the criminal
justice system is mentioned in many cases as a factor to be
considered in evaluating whether a defendant's confession was
voluntary. 32 As in the case of a suspect's youth, education, or
mental illness, a suspect's knowledge of the system is relevant in
ascertaining whether a suspect sufficiently understood the nature
of the interrogation situation when he confessed. From the Court's
perspective, a suspect's lack of knowledge or understanding about
the criminal justice system could make it easier for police to
confuse, trick, or simply coerce him into making an incriminating
statement during custodial interrogation. 3 ' Thus, the defendant's
knowledge of the criminal justice system, while not of utmost
importance to the Court's analysis, is another factor considered in
the totality of the circumstances determination of whether a
defendant's confession was voluntary.
These five factors comprise the means by which courts
determined whether confessions were voluntary before Miranda
was decided. Of course, the due process standard has continued to
be used to assess voluntariness after the Miranda decision;
however, it is no longer the primary method of analysis. In the
Miranda framework, the initial inquiry is whether a defendant
was read and understood his rights before making an
incriminating statement. Only after a defendant waives his
Miranda rights is the due process standard used to determine
whether the statement was voluntary.234 In this role, the due
process standard has continued to develop in post-Miranda case
law.
The post-Miranda cases assessing confessions under the
voluntariness standard use the same factors as courts did before
Miranda was decided. 2 5
However, in the decades following
render a confession inadmissible under voluntariness standard).
232. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959) (noting that the
defendant had "no past history of law violation or of subjection to official
interrogation.").
233. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-01 (1948) (dismissing the
argument that the defendant had been informed of his constitutional rights
before he confessed in light of defendant's young age and the denial of access

to counsel or to his mother during the interrogation).
234. It should be noted that many courts, including the Supreme Court,
seem to have treated these two steps of the analysis as one inquiry. Id.
Nonetheless, the due process test has been clearly applied by courts in a
number of cases following Miranda. See Steven Schulhofer, Reconsidering
Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435, 440 (1987). In these post-Miranda due

process cases, courts have continued to consider the factors mentioned above
in making a judgment as to whether the confession was voluntary in light of
the totality of the circumstances.
235. For example, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the
Court referred back to its pre-Miranda due process jurisprudence in
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Miranda, it has become increasingly difficult to exclude a
confession as involuntary under the due process standard.
Miranda itself seems to have contributed to this effect, since, in
most cases involving the due process standard, the defendant in
question necessarily waived his Miranda rights. In cases in which
the Miranda warnings were waived by a defendant prior to
confession, courts are much less likely to find resulting confessions
involuntary.8 6 On the other hand, in situations in which a suspect
was not read his Miranda rights, courts are more likely to find any
resulting statement involuntary." 7
Thus, the presumption of coercion in the interrogation room,
which the Miranda Court recognized and which the Miranda rule
is designed to combat, has impacted subsequent applications of the
due process standard. It is true that the presumption of coercion
created by the Miranda rule gives police an incentive to read the
warnings in every case. 8 Unfortunately, this presumption has
become a double-edged sword in the hands of the Supreme Court.
Once the Mirandawarnings are read, the presumption of coercion
is removed, and it becomes more difficult for suspects to prove that
their confessions were involuntary under the due process
standard. Indeed, it seems that the Court applies a presumption
against coercion in cases in which a suspect is found to have
knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. This

explaining its application of the voluntariness standard:

In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular
case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding

circumstances - both the characteristics of the accused and the details of
the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into account have included
the youth of the accused, his lack of education, or his low intelligence,

the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the
length

of detention, the repeated

and prolonged nature

of the

questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation
of food or sleep.
412 U.S. at 226 (citations omitted).

The Court further asserted that these

factors are to be assessed in each individual case, that no one factor is
dispositive to the analysis, and that the Court must take into account the
totality of the circumstances. Id. at 226-27.
236. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (Mirandawarnings

given, waived by the defendant; confession held voluntary in spite of evidence
that the defendant was mentally ill when he confessed); Miller, 796 F.2d at
600 (Miranda warnings given, waived by the defendant; confession held

voluntary).
237. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). The defendant
was befriended by a FBI informant while in jail. Id. at 283. When the
informant promised to protect him from harm at the hands of the other

inmates in exchange for his confession, the defendant made incriminating
statements to him. Id. at 286. The Supreme Court held that the confession
was involuntary due to coercion. Id. at 288.
238. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985) ("Failure to administer
Mirandawarnings creates a presumption of compulsion.").
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seems to be a perverse result of the Miranda decision, since it
essentially leaves suspects with no protection once they agree to
submit to questioning after being told of their rights to silence and
to counsel.
In the context of the congressional alternative before the
Court in Dickerson, of course, the direct impact of Miranda on the
due process standard is irrelevant. What is important to consider
is exactly what the due process standard is, as it exists today. The
due process standard consists of several factors, none of which are
determinative. The flexible nature of the standard is such that,
although the presence of more factors makes it increasingly likely
that a court will find the defendant's confession involuntary, it is
extremely difficult to predict the outcome of a due process analysis
in most factual situations. The only clear rules in the current due
process doctrine are that the use of physical force or violence by
police in order to induce a confession is prohibited, and that state
action is necessary for a confession to be found involuntary.
Otherwise, courts evaluate the totality of the circumstances by
noting whether the length of the interrogation was excessive,
whether the defendant was mentally incompetent, whether police
engaged in obvious psychological intimidation, and whether the
defendant lacked any prior knowledge of the criminal justice
system. If more of these factors are present in the evaluated
circumstance, then a court may find the defendant's confession to
be involuntary and thus inadmissible.
In order to answer the question whether Miranda is truly
more protective of suspects' Fifth Amendment rights than the due
process standard, an examination of the Miranda doctrine in its
current state is required. The next section will provide an
overview of the current protections offered by the Miranda
doctrine as it exists today more than thirty years after it was
originally instituted. After the legal implications of Miranda and
its progeny are set forth, a comparison between the due process
standard and the Miranda doctrine will be made from the
perspectives of suspects, law enforcement, and the criminal justice
system. From that comparison, an assessment as to whether the
Miranda decision is at least more protective than the due process
standard will be possible.
B. The Current State of the Miranda Doctrine: Protectorof Rights
or PragmaticIllusion?
The due process standard, with its consideration of the
totality of the circumstances surrounding each confession, is a
flexible standard requiring a fact-intensive inquiry. By contrast,
the Supreme Court in Miranda set forth a bright-line rule
designed to ensure the protection of individual suspects' Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
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Noting that the atmosphere in a custodial interrogation is
inherently intimidating, the Court held that protective devices
(later called "prophylactic rules") were necessary to enable
suspects to make a truly voluntary decision of whether to confess
during a custodial interrogation.239 The Court returned to a
seemingly abandoned definition of voluntariness in asserting that
a confession was not voluntary unless the confessor "chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will."24 ° Construing the
Fifth Amendment broadly,24' the Court extended its protection
beyond statements made by individuals in court proceedings, and
on that basis justified the formulation of the now-famous Miranda
warnings, and their application to custodial interrogation
situations.24
The Warren Court created a fairly clear rule in Miranda.
Before the custodial interrogation of a suspect takes place, police
must read the suspect four warnings, to inform the suspect of his
rights. The four warnings are: that the suspect has a right to
remain silent; that any statement the suspect makes may be used
against him in court; that the suspect has the right to the presence
of an attorney; and that if the suspect cannot afford to hire an
attorney, one will be provided for him. 4 ' The suspect may waive
these rights, provided that he does so knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. 44 The suspect may also invoke these rights at any
time during a custodial interrogation, even if he waived his rights
at the outset of the interrogation.24"' If a suspect invokes either his
right to silence or his right to have counsel present at any point
during questioning, the interrogation must immediately cease.246
Informing a suspect of his Miranda rights before custodial
questioning begins is an absolute prerequisite to the admissibility
of any statement
made during the questioning session by the
4 7
suspect.2

In Miranda, the Court did not explicitly state that it was
attempting to strike a balance between the interests of law
enforcement in apprehending and convicting suspects and the
interests of suspects in not being compelled to incriminate
themselves. Rather, the Court used a coercion rationale to justify
239. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966): "Unless adequate
protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial

surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the
product of his free choice."
240. See id. at 460 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).

241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 461.
Id.
See id. at 444, 467-73.
See id. at 444.

245. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444-45.

246. Id. at 473-74.
247. See id. at 476.
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its holding; that is, the Court asserted that the required warnings
are necessary to combat the inherently coercive atmosphere of
custodial interrogations.248 However, the Court did note that the
privilege against self-incrimination itself was meant to achieve a
"fair state-individual balance," 49 and it insisted that the rule it
announced was not meant to hamper the abilities of police to
investigate crime. 2"° Thus, it seems clear that, although the
primary rationale underlying the Miranda doctrine was to combat
the coercion inherent in custodial interrogations, an implicit
balancing rationale was present as well. In cases subsequent to
Miranda, the Court has moved away from the coercion rationale,
often justifying the exceptions it creates to the Miranda doctrine
by noting that the warnings themselves are prophylactic,25 1 or by
asserting that the rule was meant to strike a balance between the
interests of suspects and the interests of society or law
enforcement.2 2
In assessing the effectiveness of the Miranda doctrine, either
in terms of the anti-coercion rationale or the balancing rationale,
only a few of the cases subsequent to Miranda are relevant. This
is so for two reasons. First, only the effects of cases establishing
sweeping exceptions to the doctrine are assessable through
empirical evidence. The effects of cases such as Michigan v.
Mosley,25 which undoubtedly made it more difficult for suspects to
assert their rights to silence during custodial interrogation, are
nonetheless extremely difficult to capture in empirical data.254
Second, many of the exceptions to the Mirandadoctrine have been
created in uncommon fact patterns, which have not been extended
to cover many other cases. For example, in Fare v. Michael C.,25'
the Court held that a juvenile offender's request for his probation
officer, rather than a lawyer, was not the equivalent of a request
for counsel under Miranda. Although the holding may impact
juveniles in similar situations across the country, it does not affect
248. See id. at 467.
249. Id. at 460.
250. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477.
251. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985).
252. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986).
253. 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (holding that a suspect's invocation of his right to
silence under Miranda does not create a per se proscription of indefinite
duration on further questioning by officers on any subject; the proper inquiry
under Miranda is whether the suspect's right to silence, once invoked, was
"scrupulously honored" by the questioning officers, a standard which is
satisfied if officers leave when the suspect invokes, and then come back some

time later to resume questioning).
254. One reason for this difficulty is the likelihood that police will alter their
conduct if being observed by researchers (who are usually law students or law
professors). For a further discussion of the inherent difficulties in obtaining
accurate empirical evidence of police conduct, see supra Part II.
255. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
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the protections offered by the Miranda doctrine to all suspects.
The relevant exceptions to the Mirandarule can be loosely divided
into two categories: (1) admissibility of confessions obtained in
violation of Miranda; and (2) the definition of "custody" for
purposes of the Miranda doctrine. In the cases in each category,
the Court has implicitly redefined the balance between the rights
of suspects and the interests of law enforcement, almost always in
favor of law enforcement.
1. Admissibility of Confessions Obtained In Violation of Miranda
In Miranda, the Supreme Court was clear that a suspect's
confession obtained before the police read him or her the required
warnings will not be admissible against him in court. 26 Despite
the straightforward language establishing this prohibition, the
Court found enough ambiguity in it to limit its application five
years later. In Harris v. New York, the Court interpreted the
Miranda Court's prohibition against admissibility to apply only to
the use of the confession in the prosecution's case in chief.257
Under the rule announced in Harris, a confession obtained in
violation of Miranda can be used to impeach the defendant if he
chooses to testify at trial.258 In a subsequent case, Oregon v.
Hass,"' the Court followed Harris and rejected the argument that
the Harris rule would not deter police conduct that Miranda
sought to prohibit: "Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a
deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence
flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the
prosecution in its case in chief."26 The rationale behind both Hass
and Harris was the fear that Miranda'sprotections would enable
defendants to take the stand and testify falsely, despite having
confessed to the crime during interrogation.261 However, the Court
admitted to having no answer for the potential problem that the
Harris rule provides police with the incentive to continue
questioning a suspect after he invokes his right to silence or to an
attorney.262 Further, the Court seemed to ignore the argument,

256. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
257. Harris,401 U.S. at 224.
258. Id. at 225-26.
259. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
260. Id. at 721; Harris,401 U.S. at 225.
261. See Harris,401 U.S. at 226 ("The shield provided by Miranda cannot be
perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk
of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances."); Hass, 420 U.S. at 722
(applying the rule in Harris to a situation in which police questioned
defendant without reading Miranda warnings and obtained incriminating

statements, which the prosecution used to impeach the defendant's testimony
at trial).
262. See Hass, 420 U.S. at 723 (admitting that police might have an
incentive to continue questioning after invocation of Miranda, but asserting
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asserted in the Harris dissent, that a rule allowing the defendant's
confession to be used for impeachment purposes would effectively
allow the entire confession in evidence via cross examination of the
defendant, and would therefore impede a defendant's decision to
testify in his own defense. 63
The Court made further inroads on the admissibility
protections set forth in Miranda in Oregon v. Elstad.264 In Elstad,
the Court held that any information, including that provided by
witnesses, evidence, or additional incriminating statements made
by the defendant, obtained as a result of a Miranda violation are
admissible at trial as part of the prosecution's case in chief.26 As
its rationale for not excluding evidence obtained in violation of
Miranda under the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine,266 the
Court stated that the Miranda doctrine was "prophylactic" in
nature, and therefore not constitutionally required. 267 Thus, the
Court's decision in Elstad gave police further incentives to forego
reading a suspect the Miranda warnings, since even confessions
made after a Miranda violation are admissible as part of the
prosecution's case in chief, so long as they are made pursuant to a
subsequent waiver of the suspect's Miranda rights.
2.

The Meaning of "Custody" Under Miranda

A suspect's rights under Miranda attach only when he is in
custody." The Court in Miranda stated that a custodial situation
occurs when an individual is deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.269 Given the backdrop of the Miranda Court's
concerns about the inherently coercive atmosphere creating a
compulsion to confess,27 ° this standard requires an examination of
the suspect's point of view regarding whether the police impaired

that "the balance was struck in Harris,and we are not disposed to change it
now.").
263. Harris,401 U.S. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
265. Id. at 314. In Elstad, police failed to read the Mirandawarnings to the
defendant, who made incriminating statements. Id. After the statements
were made, police read the defendant his Miranda rights, he waived them,
and issued a written confession. The Court held the confession admissible.

Id.
266. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1963) (explaining
that "[tihe fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine applies to evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 (reasoning that
since the Court held that the Miranda warnings were not constitutionally

required by the

Fifth Amendment,

the

"fruits" doctrine, which is

constitutionally required, is inapplicable).
267. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306.
268. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (specifically stating that the holding of
the case pertains to "in-custody interrogation").

269. Id. at 444.
270. Id. at 468.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[34:637

his freedom to act. However, as subsequent decisions have shown,
the determination whether an individual is "in custody" is actually
quite objective and formalistic. The fact that an individual is the
"focus" of an investigation when he is questioned by officers is not
enough for the questioning to be custodial. 7' Further, the fact that
the questioning took place in an inherently coercive environment,
such as a police station, is not determinative. 72 For purposes of
the Miranda doctrine, the only relevant inquiry is whether an
individual's freedom was restricted at the time of the
interrogation.

73

In addition to construing the Miranda Court's definition of
"custody" narrowly, the Supreme Court has explicitly approved a
form of police questioning which has been growing in popularity
since the Court decided Miranda.74 In Californiav. Beheler,27' the
Court held that when a suspect agrees to accompany police officers
to the stationhouse for questioning, an ensuing questioning of the
suspect does not constitute a custodial interrogation under the
Miranda doctrine. 76 In so holding, the Court reiterated that the
ultimate determination of whether a suspect is "in custody" for
Miranda purposes hinges on "whether there is formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest."77 Thus, police need not read a suspect the
Miranda warnings when the suspect agrees to submit voluntarily
to questioning at the stationhouse, regardless of whether the
271. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976) (asserting that
the issue whether an individual is the "focus" of an investigation is relevant to
whether questioning was custodial, but that Miranda defined "focus" as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been

taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way;" and concluding that the threshold inquiry for "custody" is
therefore whether a suspect was deprived of his freedom of action).
272. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
273. The Court's interpretations of factual situations to determine whether

an individual's freedom was restricted by police have been quite literal in that

they seem to require clear circumstantial evidence that the individual subject
to questioning could not have been voluntarily questioned. See Mathis v.
United States, 391 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1968) (finding a suspect's freedom restricted
where the suspect was questioned in prison, while he was serving a prison
term for another offense); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969) (finding a

suspect's freedom restricted where the suspect was questioned in his home

following his arrest). But see Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (finding that a
suspect's freedom was not restricted where a suspect voluntarily submits to

questioning by police at the stationhouse).
274. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 881 (stating that according to
recent empirical data, police have attempted to circumvent the Miranda

requirements by turning to non-custodial questioning as defined by the Court
in the Beheler line of cases).
275. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).

276. Id. at 1125.
277. Id.
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interview takes place in a closed room or whether the suspect is in
fact the focus of any criminal investigation.
The Court has also acknowledged one type of situation in
which the Miranda rights do not attach even if a suspect is "in
the Court established a
custody." In New York v. Quarles
"public safety" exception to Miranda's requirement that the
warnings be read prior to questioning any suspect placed in
custody. In an exigent situation, in which police must obtain
information from a suspect in order to ensure the public safety,
police are not required to read the suspect the Miranda warnings
8 °
before questioning him to obtain the information they need.
According to the Court, this is a narrow exception to the Miranda
rule, rather than a means by which police can circumvent
Miranda.281 Although many commentators decried the Quarles
decision when it was originally handed down as striking a
significant blow to the Miranda doctrine, the Quarles exception
has had little effect on police behavior.282 One possible reason for
Quarles' minimal effect is the practical effect of the Court's rule in
Elstad. Since the Elstad exception permits evidence obtained from
Miranda violations to be admitted as part of the prosecution's case
in chief,282 there is no need for police to stretch the boundaries of
exigent circumstances in the attempt to obtain confession evidence
against a suspect.
C. Assessing the MirandaDoctrine Vis-A-Vis the Due Process
Standard
The Miranda doctrine as it exists today is clearly less
protective than it was when the Court originally announced its
decision in 1966. However, its core rule still remains. In order to
ensure that a confession be admissible as part of the prosecution's
case in chief, police still must read a suspect the Miranda
warnings before beginning an interrogation. If police simply want
to induce a confession, on the other hand, the Miranda warnings
need not be read, and any statement obtained is admissible as
impeachment evidence, if the defendant chooses to testify. 84
278. Id.
279. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
280. Id. at 655-56.
281. Id. at 658.
282. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985) (announcing the rule
that allows information obtained from a Miranda violation into evidence as
part of the prosecution's case in chief). Thus, even without the Quarles
exception, any evidence obtained as a result of a suspect's answers to
questions asked at the crime scene would be admissible, regardless of whether
the suspect had been read the Miranda warnings before making any
statements. Id.

283. Id. at 318.
284. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
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Similarly, any evidence resulting from a confession obtained
pursuant to a Miranda violation is also admissible at trial.285
Police have the further option of interrogating a suspect without
reading the warnings, obtaining a confession, and then reading the
warnings, hoping that the suspect will waive his rights to silence
and counsel and will confess again.8 6 Certain situations are also
exempt from Miranda'sprotection. If police are asking questions
to protect the public safety,
or if a suspect voluntarily
accompanies officers to the police station for questioning, the
Miranda rule does not apply.2 8
Even with all of its exceptions, the Miranda doctrine offers
police a bright-line rule to follow. In order to ensure that a
suspect's confession be admissible against him at trial, police must
read the suspect the four Mirandawarnings. If the suspect waives
these rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, police may
proceed with the interrogation. If he invokes his right to silence or
to counsel, police must cease questioning unless the suspect
initiates further conversation, or until a suspect's lawyer is
present. In this sense, the Miranda rule imposes a bright-line
standard to balance the rights of individual suspects against the
interests of law enforcement.
By contrast, the due process standard is a flexible series of
factors with no definitive guidelines addressing what constitutes
coercion for constitutional purposes.
Under the due process
standard, a confession is assessed for voluntariness by application
of a set of factors to the specific facts of the circumstances
surrounding the confession.
Although the flexibility of the
standard allows for determinations of voluntariness tailored to or
based on the facts of each individual case, it provides neither
courts nor police with much guidance regarding what is required
by the constitutional rights the standard is supposed to protect.
Although the due process standard is applied by courts, it
provides courts with little guidance as to how to evaluate the
admissibility of confessions. Under the due process standard,
courts are to determine whether a confession was given
voluntarily by applying a set of factors, none of which are
determinative, to each factual instance.
Since each judge
285. Elstad,470 U.S. at 314.
286. Psychological studies show that suspects who confess without being

"Mirandized" will not perceive the legal significance of waiving their rights
when they are actually read to them. Id. at 311. Suspects perceive the
confession itself as significant, not the circumstances surrounding it. Id.
Thus, it would not be difficult for police to use the Elstad exception to induce a
confession without informing a suspect of his Miranda rights, and then to
obtain a waiver and a subsequent confession from that suspect after reading

the warnings. Id.
287. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984).
288. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983).
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undoubtedly by themselves has her own view of which factors are
decisive in determining whether a confession was voluntary in
each factual instance, judicial discretion plays a major role in the
outcome of each case under the due process standard.
Leaving important evidentiary issues such as whether a
confession is admissible against a defendant at trial to the
discretion of individual judges is extremely problematic for courts,
for police, and for the criminal justice system. A discretionary
system lacks predictability.
Since the due process standard
contains no determinative factors, each judge would have her own
view of what the standard requires, depending on the facts of each
individual case. The presence of so many variables would make it
almost impossible for prosecutors and defense attorneys to gauge
the likelihood of a confession's admissibility in each case. Because
confession evidence is often the evidence most likely to ensure
conviction of a defendant,2 "9 whether a confession is admissible at
trial directly affects the plea bargaining process.
If the
admissibility of a confession is unclear or unpredictable,
negotiations between prosecution and defense for a plea bargain
may be severely impeded.29 °
The lack of predictability inherent in the due process regime
gives police little guidance as to what conduct is constitutionally
permissible in questioning suspects. 29' As a fact-intensive inquiry
whose outcome largely depends on the facts of each individual
case, the due process standard offers very few rules which police
can easily distill and follow. In addition, as a rule imposed by
courts ex post facto, rather than a standard applicable by police in
the present instance, the due process regime does not enable police
to proactively tailor their behavior to the appropriate
constitutional standard. When combined with the interests of
police to clear crimes by extracting a confession, the general lack
of guidance offered by the due process standard increases the
likelihood that police will infringe upon the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of individuals.
By contrast, Miranda offers police a clear standard of
conduct, which, if followed, will predictably result in the admission
of a suspect's confession into evidence as part of the prosecution's
case in chief. Similarly, the Miranda doctrine is far easier for
courts to apply than the due process standard. Barring extreme
instances of physical violence against a suspect during the
interrogation, if the Miranda warnings were given to a suspect,
and the suspect confessed, then the confession is admissible. It is
289. Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 133, at 67-68.
290. This is important given the increased reliance of trial courts on plea

bargaining as an efficient method of clearing cases off the docket.
291. The only real guidance provided to police by the due process standard is
its prohibition against use of physical force to induce a confession.
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true that, under Miranda, courts must assess whether a suspect's
waiver of his rights to silence or to counsel was voluntary, and
that this results in an inquiry similar to the due process
standard's factor analysis. However, the inquiry is factually
narrower than assessing an entire confession for voluntariness,
and thus easier for courts to manage.
Miranda also differs from the due process standard in that it
provides a direct check on police conduct that infringes an
individual's constitutional rights. The due process standard is
applied only by judges after the actual interrogation has
transpired. The Miranda doctrine, by contrast, enables suspects
to restrain police conduct during the interrogation, by asserting
their rights to silence and to counsel. In this sense, the theoretical
structure of the Miranda rule provides an external check on police
conduct not present in the due process standard. By empowering
suspects to stop questioning at any time, Miranda gives police
incentives to treat suspects better than the due process standard
does. Thus, police are less likely to violate the constitutional
rights of suspects under the Miranda regime than they are in the
due process regime.
Comparing the due process standard and the Miranda
doctrine clearly shows that the Miranda doctrine does offer
suspects more protection against police coercion than the due
process standard. Mirandaprovides courts with a straightforward
rule to apply, thereby enhancing the predictability of the criminal
justice system. It gives police a bright-line rule to follow regarding
appropriate conduct during custodial interrogations.
By
empowering suspects to invoke their rights during questioning, it
provides a check against coercive police conduct. Therefore, even
with its myriad exceptions, the Miranda doctrine offers suspects
better and more easily administrable protection against police
coercion than the due process standard.
Concluding that Miranda offers suspects more protection
than the due process standard clearly answers the question
whether the Dickerson Court was correct in concluding that the
due process standard is not a viable alternative under the Court's
current interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated in Dickerson, the Miranda Court asserted that
although the rule set forth was not specifically required by the
Fifth Amendment, the substantive protections resulting from it
were. Thus, no alternative which offers less protection than the
Miranda doctrine is constitutional.292 Therefore it follows that, as
292. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2334 (2000). The Miranda
Court clearly stated that, in order for alternative procedures to be
constitutional under the Fifth Amendment, they must be "at least as effective
in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a
continuous opportunity to exercise it." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
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long as the Miranda doctrine is constitutional, any alternative
which merely reinstitutes the due process standard, as does §
3501, is unconstitutional. 93
These conclusions about the due process standard, as clearly
set forth in the Dickerson opinion, remove it from consideration as
a viable alternative to the Miranda doctrine. Yet, as was seen in
the discussion of empirical findings about the effectiveness of the
Miranda rule, an alternative system must be constructed if the
rationale behind the Miranda decision is to be truly realized. In
this vein, the next section considers alternatives to the Miranda
doctrine, and assesses whether they would better facilitate the
achievement of the rationales behind the doctrine in the practical
circumstances of custodial interrogations.
IV.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE

Commentators from both sides of the issue have argued for
decades that the Miranda doctrine is ineffective. As a result,
Some of these
many alternatives have been suggested.
alternatives propose rules attempting to re-strike the balance
between the competing interests of suspects and law enforcement.
Others attempt to effect the anti-coercion rationale articulated in
Miranda, and propose rules which would guarantee that suspects
would not be subject to a coercive environment during police
Still others see the entire system of police
interrogation.
interrogation as flawed, and thus propose to restructure the
criminal justice system in accord with different investigatory
Prominent proposals advancing each of these
principles.
viewpoints will be discussed in this section. In my view, none of
the proposed alternatives discussed here are satisfactory in terms
of effecting the rationale underlying Miranda or in terms of
imposing a rule which would work, as a practical matter, in the
current American criminal justice system. After fully discussing
the positives and negatives of each proposal in this section,
therefore, I will propose my own alternative to the Miranda
doctrine in the concluding section of this Article.
One possible alternative to the Miranda doctrine is to replace
Miranda with a per se prohibition against custodial
interrogation. 94 Under this rule, advocated by Professors Irene
Merker Rosenberg and Yale Rosenberg, non-custodial questioning
would be permitted, and any incriminating statements made by a
suspect during such questioning would be admissible in court."'
293. The question whether the Miranda Court was correct in interpreting

the Fifth Amendment to require substantive protections achieved in the
warnings is not beyond doubt; however, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
294. Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for
the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69 (1989).
Such statements are
295. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 294.
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This rule aims at fulfilling the anti-coercion rationale announced
by the Miranda Court. 96
According to the Rosenbergs, all
custodial interrogations are psychologically coercive from the point
of view of suspects.297 If the Miranda rule was designed primarily
to ensure that all confessions made by suspects are truly voluntary
and made with suspects' full knowledge of their constitutional
rights, then even imposing the mandatory, non-waivable right to
counsel at the outset of a custodial situation would not ensure that
a confession to police was not the product of a psychologically
coercive situation.299
Given the inherent coercion present in
custodial interrogation situations, the free will of a suspect can
only be preserved by a rule forbidding interrogation of any suspect
in custody.
Thus, only non-custodial questioning would be
permitted, and statements given pursuant to such questioning
would be admissible in court. 99 Additional evidence against a
defendant would have to be obtained through means other than
custodial interrogation.9 °
The Rosenbergs' rule tips the balance strongly in favor of the
free will of the individual suspect, at the clear expense of law
enforcement's ability to efficiently clear crimes. There are a few
problems with this rationale in the context of the current
American criminal justice system. First, putting the suspect's free
will above all other considerations may be theoretically appealing,
but it is only questionably supported by the current Court's
interpretation of Miranda. Insofar as the current Court views
Miranda as a balance between the rights of suspects and the
interests of law enforcement, the Rosenbergs' rule goes against the
Court's rationale, completely ignoring the importance of custodial
interrogation and the confessions obtained therefrom to effective
and efficient law enforcement.
In addition, the practical
implications of the Rosenbergs' proposal would be to cause police
to push the boundaries of non-custodial interrogations. Just as
police have developed sophisticated strategies enabling them to
extract confessions under the Miranda regime, police would use
techniques devised to induce suspects to make incriminating
statements in non-custodial situations. 01 The idea that noncustodial interrogations, which often involve the suspect
admissible under current law. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125-26.
296. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 294, at 74.
297. Id. at 110.
298. Id. at 105.
299. Id. at 113.
300. Id.
301. Indeed, police departments under the Miranda regime have turned to
non-custodial interrogation as one method of circumventing Miranda's
requirements. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 881 (suggesting that
police have adjusted to Miranda by shifting to non-custodial "interviews" to
skirt Miranda'srequirements).
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"voluntarily" accompanying police to the stationhouse and being
questioned there, would not be coercive is naive at best.3 °2 The
result of the Rosenbergs' rule would be an increase in such
interrogations, in which suspects would not be advised of their
rights not to answer questions-the very situation
which the
30 3
Rosenbergs seem to be attempting to prevent.
Another possible alternative to the Miranda rule is advocated
by Professor Charles Ogletree."4 His rule requires all suspects to
be appointed counsel at the stationhouse, before custodial
interrogation begins." 5 This would be a bright-line rule that an
individual's right to counsel attaches upon arrest, rather than
upon arraignment, as current law requires. No suspect would
undergo custodial interrogation without the assistance of counsel,
and any incriminating statements made by a suspect before
consultation with counsel would not be admissible in court. °6
Admissions made by a suspect after consultation
with counsel
30 °
would be admissible against the suspect at trial.
The rationale behind Professor Ogletree's proposal is that the
Miranda rule does not adequately ensure that suspects
understand their rights when they are supposed to decide whether
to submit to questioning or to keep silent at the outset of custodial
interrogations. Citing the numerous empirical studies conducted
within the first five years after Miranda was decided, he notes
that most suspects waive their rights and give incriminating
statements to police..3
From this, and from his experience as a

302. It is interesting to note that, if non-custodial interrogations are

recognized as somewhat coercive, then the Rosenbergs' rule is prohibited by its
own rationale.
303. It is important to note that, although all police interrogations are
coercive on some level, non-custodial interrogations are inherently less
coercive than custodial interrogations. Indeed, as Cassell and Hayman found

in their study of interrogations

in Salt Lake County, non-custodial

interrogations were less successful at obtaining incriminating statements than
custodial interrogations. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 883. If the
Rosenbergs' argument was simply that a less coercive alternative to custodial
interrogation is desirable, then the shift to non-custodial interrogations which
would be caused by their rule would not be relevant. However, their argument
is that custodial interrogations are objectionable because they are coercive,
and as such prevent suspects from exercising their own free will. Thus, the
fact that non-custodial interrogations are successful in the current system
(and would be arguably more successful in a system prohibiting custodial
interrogations) undermines their conclusion that suspects' exercise of free will

would be protected under their proposed regime.
304. Ogletree, supra note 159, at 1842.

305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Although these earlier studies are methodologically suspect, the

conclusion that Professor Ogletree derives from them is in line with the
results of more recent studies. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 860; Leo,
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public defender in Washington, D.C., Professor Ogletree concludes
that the Miranda warnings do not ensure that suspects
understand their rights when police read them."°9
Another problem with the Miranda doctrine, according to
Professor Ogletree, is the conflicting roles it gives to police.310 In
administering the warnings, police must act as guardians of
suspects' rights. On the other hand, police must investigate and
clear as many crimes as possible. The most efficient way (and
sometimes the only way) to solve crimes is to obtain a confession
from the perpetrator. Thus the Miranda rule places police in the
contradictory position of telling suspects that they have the right
not to speak to them, while simultaneously attempting to induce a
confession.
The Miranda rule also fails to prevent police from
misrepresenting the evidence against suspects in attempting to
induce suspects to confess, tactics which Professor Ogletree views
as inherently coercive.3 " Since interrogations are secret, courts
have no ability to review the context in which the confession was
obtained, aside from hearing testimony from police and from the
defendant as to what transpired during the interrogation.312 Thus,
tactics that are coercive in the interrogation room are downplayed
in court, and confessions induced through police trickery are found
to be voluntary and admissible.
Professor Ogletree concludes that the only way to ensure the
ability of suspects to exercise their rights fully under Mirandais to
provide suspects with a per se, nonwaivable right to counsel before
they are interviewed by police. 13 This rule would make the
appointed attorney the guardian of suspects' rights, consequently
alleviating the conflict between the roles given police by the
Miranda doctrine and ensuring that suspects understand their
right to silence and that they waive it voluntarily.1 In addition, a
rule imposing a mandatory right to counsel would relieve courts
from having to deal with the issue of whether a suspect waived his

supra note 15, at 275.
309. Ogletree, supra note 159, at 1827.
310. Id. at 1842-43.
311. Id. at 1828-29. These types of tactics were forbidden by the Supreme

Court as early as 1897, under the rationale that they hamper the free will of
suspects to choose whether or not to incriminate themselves. Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 562 (1897). However, modern courts have permitted
such tactics, apparently on the assumption that no individual would choose to
incriminate himself, given the legal consequences of such an act, unless he is
telling the truth. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (stating
that misrepresentation of statements made by a third party do not trigger
exclusion of an otherwise voluntary confession).

312. Ogletree, supra note 159, at 1843.
313. Id. at 1842.
314. Id. at 1842-43.
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rights voluntarily, since no waiver of the right to counsel would be
permitted at all, and no waiver of the right to silence would be
permitted until after the suspect spoke with his attorney. 15
There are a number of problems with Professor Ogletree's
proposed rule, both practical and theoretical. First, since any
minimally competent attorney would advise a suspect not to say
anything to police, the logical result of the rule would be to
prevent law enforcement officers from obtaining confession
evidence altogether. Thus, a nonwaivable appointment of counsel
regime would preclude police from investigating and clearing
crimes through incriminating statements made by suspects.
Professor Ogletree does not offer a rationale nor argue the merits
of such a result, and our current criminal justice system does not
contemplate police investigation without confession evidence.
Unless we want to abolish the use of confessions in law
enforcement altogether, a rule imposing the nonwaivable
appointment of counsel at the stationhouse door would not be
desirable.
A second problem with the nonwaivable right to counsel is
that its effects would be overbroad vis-&-vis the suspects whose
confessions it would prevent. One of the main justifications
Professor Ogletree offers for his rule is that most suspects do not
understand their rights when they waive them. However, recently
collected empirical data indicates that this is not the case. While
it is true that police often minimize the importance of the Miranda
warnings when administering them, and that police use a number
of strategies to induce suspects to confess, 1 6 it is also intuitive that
many suspects decide to confess for reasons independent of police
conduct in the interrogation room.317 Therefore, a rule providing
for the nonwaivable right to counsel would be overbroad, as it
would prevent the clearly voluntary statements of suspects who
understand their rights as well as statements from those who do
not.
Third, Professor Ogletree's rule would be institutionally
difficult to implement and run efficiently.
Unless each
stationhouse contained its own public defenders' office,318 a
nonwaivable right to counsel regime would be extremely hard to
manage. Public defenders across the country are overworked in

315. Id. at 1843.
316. Leo & White, supra note 14, at 433-50.
317. See Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Hannes Petursson, Custodial Interrogation:
Why Do Suspects Confess and How Does It Relate to Their Crime, Attitude, and
Personality?, 12 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 295 (1991) (finding

that, in the context of false confessions, suspects confess for a variety of

reasons, including, but not limited to, police intimidation).
318. This would be extremely expensive to implement, as well as
institutionally contradictory.
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the current system. It would not be unreasonable to think of a
situation in which a suspect was brought in to be interviewed and
a defender could not be located. This would result in a delay for
everyone involved, including the suspect whose rights this rule
attempts to safeguard. It is true that the police do not interrogate
every suspect immediately. On the other hand, the Supreme
Court has viewed delays between arrest and arraignment as
violative of suspects' rights for over thirty years. 3 9 Although no
such rule exists regarding delays between arrest and
interrogation, the reasoning is equally applicable.
Delays in
processing make suspects acutely aware that they are directly
under the state's power and control, and have therefore been
viewed as cruel to suspects. Given this history, it would seem
counterproductive to introduce delays into the system in the name
of ensuring suspects' rights.
In addition, imposing a nonwaivable right to counsel is an
overly costly way to prevent police abuses like misstating the
evidence or making false promises during interrogations, given
that other, less expensive methods of preventing such police
conduct are available. Assuming, as Professor Ogletree does, that
police behavior of this sort would be sufficient to warrant a
conclusion of coercion by a reviewing court,"' a requirement that
all Miranda waivers and custodial interrogations be videotaped
would be a significantly less expensive method of achieving the
same result as the presence of counsel in the interrogation room.
In terms of monitoring and preventing certain types of police
conduct, videotaping would be as effective as the presence of
counsel, because videotaping would allow judges to be third-party
observers of interrogations. Judges could decide from the tape

319. See, e.g., McNabb, 318 U.S. at 344-45 (noting that legislation requiring

police to act with reasonable promptness constitutes an important safeguard);
Mallory, 354 U.S. at 455 (noting that delays between arrest and arraignment
.must not be of a nature to give opportunity for the extraction of a
confession"). In McNabb and Mallory, the Supreme Court interpreted Rule
5(a), a rule of procedure passed by Congress requiring that an accused be
brought before a magistrate after arrest, as well as a rule of evidence, which

rendered any confession obtained as a result of unnecessary delay
inadmissible, even if voluntary. In § 3501, Congress altered the evidentiary
rule so that delay would be a factor in the voluntariness analysis, rather than
a bright-line indication of involuntariness. See 1 CHARLES A. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 73 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the
application of Rule 5(a) to Malory and McNabb).
320. Professor Ogletree's argument as to the benefits of his proposed rule
makes the assumption that the conduct he describes as "police trickery" would
be considered coercive as a matter of law. However, under current law, the

presence of police trickery alone is not enough to warrant a court's conclusion
that any statement obtained therefrom was coerced. See Frazier, 394 U.S. at

739 (stating that these cases "must be decided by viewing the 'totality of the
circumstances.'").
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whether a suspect waived his Miranda rights knowingly, as well
as whether the interrogation itself was coercive. Because all of the
relevant information would be on the tape, admissibility hearings
would take less time (or even be unnecessary), and would thus be
less costly to the criminal justice system. Knowing that judges
would personally review each tape, police would have an incentive
not to use coercive interrogation strategies. Thus, while the
prevention of certain types of police trickery would be one benefit
achieved by Professor Ogletree's rule, there are other, less
expensive ways of achieving the same result in the criminal justice
system.
Finally, like the Rosenbergs' proposal, Professor Ogletree's
rule would cause police to push the boundaries of non-custodial
interrogations. Since custodial interrogations would no longer
provide an opportunity for police to obtain information from
suspects, police would turn to non-custodial interrogations as their
primary investigatory source.
Non-custodial interrogations
provide police with an opportunity to question suspects without
having to take the counterproductive step of informing suspects of
their rights to silence and to counsel.
Indeed, some police
departments use non-custodial interrogations wherever possible,
because no warnings are required in such situations."' Thus, the
practical prohibition against custodial interrogations in a
mandatory right to counsel situation would cause most suspects to
be questioned without even cursory knowledge of their rights.
Further, just as police have developed sophisticated strategies to
enable them to obtain information from suspects under the
Miranda regime, police would develop other strategies to induce
admissions from suspects in a non-custodial interrogation
environment. These new techniques may not be as effective as
those used in custodial interrogation, but they would still
significantly empower officers at the expense of suspects.
Ironically, the imposition of a nonwaivable right to counsel at the
stationhouse
could
cause more psychologically
coercive
interrogations in some circumstances.
The numerous problems with the Miranda doctrine cited by
Professors Rosenberg and Ogletree have caused some scholars to
argue that the current police interrogation regime should be
discarded and replaced with a system of judicial interrogation."
Legal scholars have advocated some version of a judicial

321. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at 881.
322. See Donald A. Dripps, Foreword:Against Police Interrogation- And the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 730
(1988) (noting proposals for judicial questioning of the accused). See also
Marvin E. Frankel, From Private Fights Toward Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 516, 529-32 (1976) (proposing that defendants be questioned in public by
a judicial officer).
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interrogation system since before Miranda was decided, when the
due process standard was the governing rule.323 Proponents of the
theory as a potential answer to the problems of the Miranda
regime interpret Miranda as a compromise between the
government's interests in investigating and clearing crimes, and
suspects' twin interests in freedom from police abuse and in the
preservation of their personal autonomy.32 4 In practice, however,
the Miranda rule has not achieved the balance it sought. Miranda
has not effectively combated the inherently coercive atmosphere of
custodial interrogations, nor has it prevented defendants from
being tricked or cajoled into giving incriminating statements
during custodial questioning. Indeed, cases following Miranda
have been increasingly permissive of police strategies designed to
convince suspects to waive their rights and confess."
Proponents of the shift to a judicial interrogation system note
an apparent paradox in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. While
the Fifth Amendment does not prevent against most strategies
used by police to extract confessions during custodial
interrogations, it unequivocally protects defendants from being
compelled by the state to incriminate themselves in court, where
assurances against state abuses are greatest.3 2 6 To solve this
apparent contradiction, Judge Marvin Frankel proposed that
suspects be questioned by a magistrate, in court, rather than by
police at the stationhouse.2 In Judge Frankel's system, suspects
would appear in court and would be interrogated by the presiding
judge or magistrate on the witness stand.3"' Throughout the
interrogation, suspects would be represented by counsel.3 29
Custodial interrogations by police would be prohibited by making

323. See, e.g., Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused - A
Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224, 1225 (1932) (calling
judicial examination of the accused the "most promising remedy" for policy
abuse cases). Advocates of judicial interrogation have built their arguments
upon Kauper's article after Miranda was decided. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly,
The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U.
CIN. L. REV. 671, 721-22 (1968) (proposing an amendment to the U.S.
Constitution that prohibits application of the 5th Amendment to certain types

of testimony). Since Judge Frankel's proposal is generally in line with earlier
ones, and since he attributed the fundamentals of his proposal to these earlier

writings, I have used his proposal as representative of the viewpoint for the
purposes of this Article.
324. Dripps, supra note 322, at 700.
325. See id. (noting that since Miranda was decided courts have attempted
to maximize the frequency of confessions); Frankel, supra note 322, at 527

(noting that Miranda allows officials a wide variety of ways to obtain
statements from suspects).
326. Frankel, supra note 322, at 527.

327. Id. at 529.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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the Miranda rights nonwaivable."' If a suspect invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during a judicial
interrogation, however, the prosecutor would be permitted to
comment on it at trial. 3
Professor Donald Dripps suggests an alternative method of
implementing a judicial interrogation method. His version of a
judicial interrogation system, which seems to draw on the
federalism inherent in the American court system, would repeal
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
direct states to establish their own systems of in-court
interrogation.332 In order to ensure an effective prohibition on
custodial questioning, any statement obtained by police from an
arrested suspect would be inadmissible at trial.333 Under this rule,
psychologically coercive tactics practiced by police to induce
confessions would be prevented, while suspects would be
simultaneously prohibited from frustrating the investigatory
process by using the right to silence as a shield against giving
incriminating information.
As a practical matter, a system of judicial interrogation,
whether following Professor Dripps' model or Judge Frankel's
model, would be impossible to implement in the American criminal
justice system. Imposition of Judge Frankel's model would require
the Court to overrule
long-standing
precedent 3.4 and
simultaneously to expand its interpretation of both the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.33' Imposition of Professor Dripps' alternative
would require disincorporation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, so that it no longer applied to the states. 3 6 It is
extremely unlikely that any of these legal changes would take

330. Id.
331. Note that implementation of such a rule would violate the Supreme
Court's prohibition on comments regarding a defendant's refusal to testify.
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1955) (holding that the Fifth

Amendment forbids a prosecutor's or Court's comment on a defendant's refusal
to testify at trial).
332. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 322, at 728-31 (discussing ways in which
the Court could prod states to impose equivalent protections).

333. Id. at 728.
334. As stated earlier, allowing prosecutors to comment on a defendant's
silence would violate the Court's holding in Griffin. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.

335. Constitutional authority for prohibiting custodial interrogations at the
stationhouse would presumably have to come from an extension of the current
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, following from Miranda. An extension

of the Sixth Amendment, which currently requires the right to counsel to
attach only at arraignment, provides authority for the mandatory presence of
counsel at judicial interrogation.
336. This would require the Court to overrule Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964), which originally incorporated the Fifth Amendment privilege to apply

to the states.
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place in our current system. Police interrogation has been an
integral part of the American criminal justice system for over a
century; all of American criminal law is designed around it. To
suddenly change to a system of judicial interrogation would
require a massive restructuring of the entire criminal justice
system, and there is no sign that judges or legislators are
interested in embarking on such a project. Repeal of the Fifth
Amendment, which would be required to implement Professor
Dripps' version of judicial interrogation at the federal level, is also
unlikely, given the amendment process provided in the
Constitution and the symbolic significance the privilege has
amongst American citizens.
Aside from the practical difficulties of implementation,
shifting the investigatory role of the police to the judicial branch
has other problems. In the current system, the judiciary provides
a check on police behavior. When courts review confessions for
voluntariness, or when magistrates issue search warrants, the
judiciary is, at least theoretically, preventing the state from
abusing its power in investigating the activities of its citizens. If
the judiciary itself were to perform interrogations, however,
nothing would be left to provide a check on judicial power. The
resulting system could be more intrusive of the rights of
individuals than the current system.
In addition, it is not clear that a system of judicial
interrogation would significantly diminish the psychologically
coercive environment of interrogations. Admittedly, the more
public and open setting of a courtroom would make judicial
interrogations
inherently
less
coercive
than
custodial
interrogations. But it is not clear that a judicial interrogation
system would not still be coercive to suspects, despite the presence
of counsel. From the point of view of some suspects, standing
before a judge or magistrate in a courtroom could be more
intimidating, and thus more psychologically coercive, than talking
with a police officer in the stationhouse. This could be due to class
differences between the judge and the suspect, or to the formal
nature of the judicial institution, which can be alienating to laypersons. Whatever the reason, if it is true that some suspects
would find judicial interrogations at least as intimidating as police
interrogations, then judicial interrogation does not truly solve the
coercion problem - the main rationale advanced for its
implementation.
One benefit which could result from a judicial interrogation
regime is that it would render unavailable the sophisticated
strategies commonly used by police to induce confessions in the
current system. As argued above, however, it is not at all clear
that these techniques should be prohibited in a system which
continues to rely on confession evidence to clear crimes and convict
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defendants.33 7 Further, there are other available methods of
monitoring police conduct, such as imposing a rule requiring that
all custodial interrogations be videotaped,3 8 which would not
require a massive restructuring of the American criminal justice
system.
A final alternative to the Miranda doctrine that warrants
serious consideration is the imposition of mandatory videotaping
for all custodial interrogations. Videotaping interrogations has
been suggested as a systemic remedy for abusive police conduct for
decades, and has been implemented in some American police
departments since the 1980s.339 Some police departments already
videotape all of their interrogations to foster an image of
legitimacy amongst the public, to train other officers in proper
interrogation techniques, and to preserve a record of suspects who
waive their Miranda rights. 4
Commentators advocating
mandatory videotaping as a modification of the Miranda doctrine
have generally put forth two distinct proposals. The first is to
retain the Miranda doctrine while mandating the use of
videotaping for all custodial interrogations. 4' Under this regime,
all custodial interrogations would be videotaped, from the point at
which police read the Miranda warnings to the suspect through
the end of the interrogation.34 The second alternative proposed
regarding videotaped confessions is to impose mandatory
videotaping of custodial interrogations in lieu of Miranda, so that
all custodial questioning would be videotaped, but no Miranda
warnings would be given. 43 Under this rule, courts would use the
videotape to assess the voluntariness of the confession, with the
result that the confession would be admitted in evidence unless it
was viewed on tape by the presiding judge and deemed to be
involuntary.3 " The due process standard would once again be the
337. Leo & White, supra note 14, at 451-514.
338. See supra text accompanying note 321.
339. Leo, supra note 3, at 681.
Mandatory videotaping has become
increasingly popular across the country. Id. Some states have gone so far as
to impose mandatory audio taping or videotaping requirements on police
departments as a matter of law. See, e.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156,
1162 (Alaska 1985) (adopting a rule to require electronic recording of custodial
interrogations); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (calling the
recording of custodial interrogations a "reasonable and necessary safeguard"
for defendants).
340. Leo, supra note 3, at 683.

341. Id. at 681-82.
342. Id. at 682.
343. See Cassell, supra note 56, at 487 (suggesting that videotaped custodial
interrogations should actually replace Miranda warnings); Cassell & Fowles,

supra note 85, at 1130.
344. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 85, at 1130 (stating that judges would
determine the voluntariness of the confession after actually viewing the
confession itself).
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governing standard of the admissibility of confessions, with the
modification that judges would be able to assess voluntariness
themselves, by viewing the videotaped interrogation, rather than
by listening to testimony from police and the defendant.
From the perspective of police, the benefits of videotaping,
with or without the Miranda warnings, are numerous.
Videotaping would lend credibility and legitimacy to this aspect of
police work in the eyes of the public. 34 5" An indisputable record of
actual interrogations would protect police against false
accusations of impropriety and abuse.4 6 Since officers could be
observed on tape by superiors as well as courts, videotaping could
improve the quality of police work.3 47 Further, videotaping would
aid police in investigating and solving crimes more effectively,
because detectives could view the interrogation additional times,
either in light of new evidence discovered in a case, or to uncover
more details originally missed by the interrogating officers.348
Videotaping would also enable police to use resources more
efficiently, since an additional officer would no longer need to be
present to take notes during the interrogation. The tapes could
also be used for police training purposes.349 Videotaping would be
relatively inexpensive to implement, especially given that many
police departments are already equipped with videotaping
capabilities."'
Further, videotaping would save police
departments money in terms of time and resources, since fewer
personnel would be required to be present during interrogations,
and since police would no longer have to testify at hearings
regarding voluntariness. In addition, a mandatory videotaping
rule is bright-line and would be easy for police to follow and for
courts to monitor.
Suspects would also benefit from the videotaping of custodial
interrogations. The "swearing contest" between the interrogating
officer and the defendant on the stand as to whether Miranda
rights were truly waived, or whether the defendant's confession
was coerced, would be eliminated due to the preservation of an
accurate record. 5
Videotaping would reinforce the current
judicial check on police conduct, because judges would be able to
review the circumstances of all custodial interrogations. Physical
345. See Leo, supra note 3, at 683 (describing the many benefits of
videotaped interrogations to the police).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 683-84.
349. See id. at 683.
350. See Leo, supra note 3, at 684-85 (discussing the current use of

videotaping by many police departments and the misconceptions of police
departments in some jurisdictions about the costs of videotaping).

351. See id. at 687 (suggesting that such confrontations in court are typically
decided in favor of police).
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coercion by police during interrogations would be eradicated, since
any actions made by the interrogating officers would be captured
on videotape." 2 By enabling others to view the interrogation,
videotaping would significantly diminish the secrecy of the
custodial situation used by police to intimidate suspects during
interrogations. 353 Finally, suspects and the criminal justice system
as a whole would benefit from the increased fairness resulting
from truly informed judicial review.
The concept of mandatory videotaping provides a possible
solution to the criticism that Miranda does not perform an
adequate check on both physically and psychologically coercive
police practices. Assuming that judges or juries would be applying
proper standards to determine whether a confession was
voluntary, the window into custodial interrogations provided by
videotaping could enable courts to monitor and stop certain
coercive strategies used by police to extract confessions. At the
same time, videotaping would not provide a shield behind which
guilty defendants could hide their admissions of culpability.
However, neither proposal articulated above would sufficiently
ensure the achievement of this balance. Without additional
safeguards, videotaping could be manipulated by police just as the
Miranda warnings have been. Many defense attorneys have
argued against videotaping, asserting that it is prone to police
circumvention while simultaneously appearing as extremely
credible evidence of a defendant's guilt to judges and juries."'
Without additional rules, a videotaping regime does nothing to
prevent police from using sophisticated psychological strategies to
convince suspects to confess on camera, because such strategies do
not constitute coercion under the due process standard. Jurors,
already prone to regard confessions as highly probative of guilt,
may put even more weight on videotaped confessions than on
transcripts in convicting defendants, since actually seeing the
defendant confessing on tape would have more impact than paper
Thus, although videotaping could provide part of a
testimony.5
viable alternative to Miranda, by itself it is not a sufficient
replacement for the current doctrine.

352. See Cassell, supra note 56, at 486 (stating that videotaping is one
possible tool for combating police coercion since the Mirandadecision).
353. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 166, at 24-28. Police interrogation expert
Fred Inbau asserts that the effectiveness of all successful interrogations is due
at least in part to the interrogator's ability to take advantage of the privacy of
the custodial situation. Id.
354. See Leo, supra note 3, at 684 (asserting that defense attorneys reject
the idea of videotaped interrogations).
355. See WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, supra note 194, at 117 (suggesting that the
use of videotaped confessions in the courtroom may influence jurors).
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CONCLUSION: ADVOCATING A NEW ALTERNATIVE TO THE MIRANDA

DOCTRINE

In articulating its bright-line rule governing the admissibility
of confessions, the Miranda Court asserted as its rationale that
suspects should be given the means by which to combat the
inherent coercion present in custodial interrogations. In recent
decades, Miranda has been viewed as attempting to achieve a
balance between the interests of law enforcement in solving crimes
and convicting criminals, and the interests of suspects in not being
induced to confess by police tactics.356 Although these two
rationales are often discussed as different approaches, they can be
reconciled within the same theory by viewing coercion in terms of
suspects' interests. The interests of suspects in not being
convinced by police to issue a confession can be restated as an
interest not to be compelled by sophisticated police techniques to
give a confession during a custodial interrogation. Thus, the
balancing rationale can be recast as a compromise between law
enforcement's' interests in obtaining confession evidence by any
means necessary, and suspects' interests in not being subject to
certain practices designed to induce them, psychologically or
physically, to incriminate themselves.
If this is the theory Miranda is supposed to effect, it is clear
that the Warren Court's attempt has failed. The warnings fail to
adequately combat much of the inherently coercive atmosphere of
the interrogation room. Approximately 80% of all suspects waive
5 '
their Miranda rights at the outset of custodial interrogations."
Police have developed myriad techniques by which to effect
waivers and to induce confessions, none of which are regulated
under the Miranda doctrine. With the advent of exceptions to the
Miranda doctrine in recent decades, police departments across the
country have begun to question certain suspects "outside Miranda"
altogether. Although the declines in clearance and confession
rates after Mirandawas decided show that Miranda has probably
had some impact on the ability of police to obtain confession
evidence in the aggregate, the extent of this impact is debatable,
as is the extent of the attribution of both declines to Miranda
alone. Even assuming that the clearance and confession rate data
support the proposition that Miranda has had some detrimental
effect on law enforcement's ability to solve crimes and convict
defendants, this cost to law enforcement does not equal a benefit
to individual suspects. The only way that Miranda's "careful
balance" can truly work is if suspects gain protections in exchange
356. As argued above, this balancing rationale does have some implicit root
in the Miranda decision itself. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460, 477. See also
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307, 477 (1985).
357. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15.
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for the costs borne by law enforcement. Because the current rule
does not adequately protect suspects from coercive police tactics,
the practical effects of Miranda have fallen short of the decision's
stated objectives.
The proposed alternatives to the Miranda doctrine discussed
above also fail to strike the appropriate balance between the
interests of law enforcement and those of suspects. The rules
advocated by Professors Rosenberg and Ogletree err in viewing the
anti-coercion rationale as the only desired end of the Miranda
rule. It is true that a rule abolishing custodial interrogations or a
rule mandating the right to counsel in custodial interrogations
would almost completely eradicate the use of coercive tactics by
police to induce suspects to confess, but it would be at the expense
of eliminating the use of confession evidence in the criminal justice
system. This would greatly disadvantage the ability of law
enforcement to clear crimes and obtain convictions, a result not
contemplated by the balancing rationale adopted by the Court in
recent decades, but also not practical considering the importance
of confession evidence to efficiency of crime clearance, and to the
ultimate conviction of defendants. Shifting to a system of judicial
interrogation might be one way to alleviate the coercion of
custodial interrogations while still facilitating the use of
confession evidence, but implementation of such a system would
require a complete overhaul of the criminal justice system, and
has some practical pitfalls. On the other hand, while mandatory
videotaping would be fairly easy to implement in our current
system, videotaping without additional standards would not
sufficiently protect suspects against coercive police tactics during
custodial interrogations.
In order to more effectively achieve the balance between the
interests of suspects and the interests of law enforcement for
which the Court and commentators have argued, I propose a new
alternative to the Miranda doctrine. Videotaping should be made
mandatory for all custodial interrogations. The Mirandawarnings
should be retained, and the requirement that they be given at the
outset of the interrogation should still stand. The issuance of the
warnings and any waiver made by a suspect would be included in
the videotape of the interrogation.
Failure to videotape
interrogations in their entirety, including the issuance of the
Miranda warnings and any waiver made by the suspect, would
render any statement obtained therefrom inadmissible in any
capacity at trial. In addition, promises of leniency and any
misrepresentation of the evidence against the suspect would be
prohibited as tactics used by police to induce a confession. The use
of such tactics by police, either to induce a Miranda waiver or to
induce a confession during custodial interrogation, would render
any incriminating statements on the tape inadmissible for any
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purpose at trial. 58 The videotapes would be reviewed by the judge
prior to trial to resolve issues such as whether a suspect
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, or whether a suspect's
confession is admissible. Once the content of the videotape is
deemed admissible, then jurors would be permitted to view the
confession on videotape as part of the evidence in the case.
A modified videotaping procedure contains all of the benefits
to law enforcement associated with mandatory videotaping of
custodial interrogations generally."5 9 From the perspective of
police, videotaping would enable them to use their personnel and
resources more efficiently, to supervise officers more closely, and
to train officers more effectively. Videotaping would also enhance
the reputation of police amongst the public. In addition, as brightline rules, the prohibitions against promises of leniency and
misrepresentation of the evidence against suspects would give
police clear guidance as to what types of tactics would render a
confession inadmissible. Under the current standard, once a
suspect waives his Miranda rights, police and courts have only the
flexible due process standard as guidelines by which to determine
proper police conduct. Imposing bright-line prohibitions against
two specific types of conduct would be relatively easy for courts to
apply and for police to follow.
From the perspective of suspects, a modified videotaping
system would lead to better treatment by police and a less coercive
atmosphere during custodial interrogations. The knowledge that a
judge will be reviewing the taped interrogation to determine the
admissibility of any incriminating statements made by a suspect
would cause police to treat suspects more respectfully, and would
render interrogations less intimidating. Interrogators would no
longer be able to view the custodial situation as secret, and their
ability to use this characteristic of the custodial situation to
intimidate suspects would be impaired as a result, especially if
suspects were aware that third parties will watch the tape
afterwards. In addition, videotaping would eliminate the in-court
"swearing contest" between the interrogating officer and the
defendant, almost always resolved in favor of the officer, as to
whether the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, or
as to what happened inside the interrogation room to induce the
defendant to confess. Further, overly coercive tactics by police
would be eliminated because of the individual accountability made
358. Because Elstad and Harris apply only to confessions obtained in
violation of Miranda, they do not prohibit the formulation of the bright-line
prohibition against admissibility articulated here.
359. Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1158; Scales, 518 N.W. 2d at 591-93; Cassell,
supra note 56, at 487; Cassell & Fowles, supra note 85, at 1130; Leo, supra
note 3, at 681-87; INBAU, ET AL., supra note 166, at 24-28; WRIGHTSMAN &

KASSIN, supra note 195, at 117.
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possible by mandatory videotaping. In short, the institution of
meaningful judicial review through videotaping would cause police
conduct to become more professional, while making the
atmosphere of interrogations inherently less coercive.
The prohibitions against promises of leniency and
misrepresentation of the evidence against the subject of the
interrogation would also benefit suspects by reducing the amount
of coercion present in custodial interrogations. Empirical evidence
collected from studies of false confessions has shown that these
strategies are amongst those most likely to induce a suspect to
confess falsely.36 ° The fact that such tactics result in a significant
number of false confessions shows that they are especially
compelling from the point of view of suspects.36' In addition, the
Supreme Court has recognized the inherently coercive nature of
the use of both tactics in inducing suspects to confess. 36' From this
evidence, it is clear that the elimination of such tactics would
render interrogations less coercive from the point of view of
suspects generally.
The modified videotaping regime proposed here would also
confer a number of benefits on the criminal justice system. First,
such a rule would increase the trustworthiness of confessions and
would reduce the number of false confessions obtained by police
every year. Empirical studies have found that promises of
leniency and misrepresentations of the evidence against suspects
are amongst those strategies most likely to induce false
confessions during custodial interrogations." 3
A bright-line
prohibition against such procedures would therefore increase the
trustworthiness of confessions in the aggregate, a desirable result
360. Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS
L. REv. 2001, 2050-54 (1998).
361. See id. at 2046. It should be noted that the other tactic found to result
in a significant number of false confessions was questioning a suspect for an

especially lengthy period of time-a strategy which has been limited by courts'
application of the due process standard. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 15, at
920; Leo, supra note 15, at 279, 282-283; Ashcraft, 322 U.S. 143; Spano, 360
U.S. 315; Fikes, 332 U.S. 596.
362. See Brain, 168 U.S. at 562 (holding that misrepresentation of the
evidence against a suspect renders confession involuntary because such a

tactic necessarily indicates that the decision to confess was not made under
the suspect's own free will); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (holding
that promises of leniency rendered confession involuntary where interrogator
told suspect that, if she did not confess, she would get ten years in prison and

her children would be taken away from her, but that if she did confess, he
would recommend leniency and ensure that she would keep her children).
Also note that the presence of police conduct such as misrepresentation of the
evidence against the suspect or promises of leniency made in exchange for a

confession were considered as factors tending to indicate involuntariness
under the pre-Miranda due process standard. See, e.g., Spano, 360 U.S. at
323. See also supra notes 226-230 and accompanying text.
363. See White, supra note 360, at 2050-55.
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from an evidentiary perspective, and one read into the Miranda
opinion by some scholars.3" The prohibitions would also reduce
the risks that innocent persons would confess to, and ultimately be
convicted of, crimes that they did not commit, which would
ultimately serve the interests of the criminal justice system in
ensuring that the guilty are convicted while the innocent are set
free.
Second, the use of promises of leniency and misrepresentation
of the evidence against a suspect by officers of the state during
custodial interrogation offends the general principles of fairness
that are supposed to underlie the criminal justice system. Both
strategies require police substantively to lie to suspects in the
most blatant manner possible in order to obtain a confession. In
neither case could police produce the material fact (i.e., the
promise or the evidence) used to persuade the suspect to
incriminate himself.3 66 It seems obvious that such tactics are clear
abuses of state power, as well as simply morally wrong, and should
not be permitted on those bases.
Finally, a modified videotaping process would be relatively
inexpensive to implement, especially compared with other
proposed alternatives to the Miranda doctrine. Many police
departments already videotape custodial interrogations. 66 In fact,
two states have implemented mandatory recording of custodial
interrogations as a matter of law.367
Under a mandatory
videotaping regime, police departments would save resources in
terms of time and personnel, since the presence of additional
officers to observe the questioning or to take notes during the
interrogation would no longer be necessary. Videotaping would
result in cost savings to courts and prosecutors as well. A judge
could review an interrogation to determine voluntariness without
conducting extensive hearings.
The bright-line prohibitions
against specific police conduct would be easy for police to follow
and for courts to apply. Prosecutors would be better able to assess
the strength of their cases for plea bargaining purposes. Overall,
the expense required to implement a modified videotaping regime
would be minimal, and would be counteracted by the resulting cost
savings to the criminal justice system.
364. See KAMISAR, supra note 4, at 473 (interpreting Miranda's underlying
rationale as not only an attempt to safeguard the rights of the accused, but
also to assure the reliability of statements made during interrogations).
365. Police have no authority over prosecutorial charging decisions, and they
do not have the power to obtain treatment of any sort for a suspect. See Leo &
White, supra note 14, at 444-46.
366. See Leo, supra note 3, at 682.
367. As noted earlier, the two states operating under a mandatory taping
regime are Minnesota and Alaska.
See Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 591-93
(Minnesota's videotaping regime); Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1158 (Alaska's audio
taping regime).
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Although it would prohibit police from using two effective
interrogation strategies, the modified videotaping regime would
not greatly impair police from obtaining confessions from guilty
suspects. Most of the techniques used by police to obtain valid
waivers of Miranda would still be permitted, 68 although they
would be required to be videotaped. Given the range of police
conduct permitted by the current voluntariness standard, it is
unlikely that any of the strategies most commonly used to induce
waivers would be sufficient to render a confession inadmissible.369
Similarly, most of the strategies used by police to obtain
confessions during custodial interrogations would still be available
under the modified videotaping regime. Since the videotapes
would be reviewed under the post-Miranda due process standard,
videotaping itself would not change the fact that most police
tactics, aside from the physical abuse of suspects, are permissible
methods of extracting confessions.370 Promises of leniency and
misrepresentation of the evidence against a suspect would be the
only two tactics clearly prevented under the modified videotaping
regime. Due to the fact that police have so many other tactics at
their disposal, as well as the power advantage in custodial
interrogations generally, these prohibitions should have no
significant impact on confession rates.
Even if the modified videotaping method proposed here were
to result in a decrease in confession rates, it is important to note
that the relationship between the ability of police to extract
confessions from suspects and suspects' interests in not being
compelled to incriminate themselves is not necessarily zero-sum.
In assessing the balance between the interests of law enforcement
and the interests of suspects, impairing the ability of police to
obtain confessions in the aggregate does not necessarily tip the
scales in favor of suspects' interests. Many rules could cause
confession rates to fall without benefiting most individual
suspects. For example, a rule prohibiting the interrogation of any
suspect with a history of mental illness would benefit suspects
with such a history, and would result in lower confession rates in
the aggregate, but would not benefit the majority of suspects,
whose individual rights in the interrogation room would remain
368. See Leo & White, supra note 14, at 431-47 (setting forth at least seven
techniques commonly used by police to obtain Miranda waivers which would
not be prohibited in the modified videotaping regime proposed here).
369. Of the two specifically prohibited tactics, only promises of leniency seem
to be used to induce suspects to waive their Mirandarights. Both tactics are
primarily used during interrogations, rather than during the waiver phase of
the process. See id.

370. In fact, Paul Cassell, the most prominent pro-law-enforcement
commentator in the field of confessions and the criminal justice system, is a
strong advocate of using mandatory videotaping in lieu of Miranda. See
Cassell, supra note 56, at 486-92.
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the same. The rule proposed here would decrease the amount of
coercion to which all suspects are subject, and would eliminate
unfair conduct in which police regularly engage. It may not result
in as large a decrease in the aggregate confession rate as a strict
prohibition against interrogation of all suspects with a history of
mental illness, but it better ensures the protections given to all
suspects by the Fifth Amendment. In this sense, this proposed
rule comes far closer than Miranda itself to achieving the careful
balance contemplated in the Court's post-Mirandajurisprudence.
It better protects suspects against coercion by police in the
interrogation room, while still allowing police to conduct successful
custodial interrogations.
Admittedly, the modified videotaping regime that I propose
does not completely eliminate the inherently coercive environment
present in custodial interrogations. Police will still be able to
induce waivers of Miranda rights by minimizing the Miranda
warnings. During interrogations, police will still be able to use
numerous psychological techniques, such as proffered sympathy or
pretended flattery, to persuade suspects that it is in their best
interest to confess.
The custodial situation will remain
intimidating to suspects, and will continue to give police an
advantage in obtaining confessions, even without the use of
sophisticated strategies and techniques. In my view, it would be
impossible to invent a rule, aside from one barring the use of
custodial interrogations altogether, which could truly and
completely alleviate the coercion inherent in the custodial
situation. It is clear that neither Congress nor the Court is willing
to abandon the use of confession evidence obtained through
custodial interrogation to convict defendants at criminal trials.
Indeed, the Miranda Court itself implicitly rejected this possibility
when it assumed that its created warnings would be adequate to
combat the "inherently coercive nature" of custodial
interrogations, rather than extending its announced coercion
principle to its logical extent and banning custodial interrogations
altogether."7 ' Given the fact that the criminal justice system will
continue to rely on confession evidence obtained through custodial
interrogations, the modified videotaping regime advocated here
strikes a more meaningful balance between the interests of police
in obtaining confessions and the interests of suspects in not being
subject to state-sponsored coercion than any of the other
alternatives contemplating the continued use of custodial
interrogations, including the Miranda doctrine itself.
The modified videotaping regime proposed here also does not
371. In his dissent in Miranda, Justice White pointed out the logical fallacy
of the Court's reliance on the inherent coercion principle to require that police
read the warnings to suspects before commencing with the inherently coercive
situation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting).
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protect suspects against the practice of questioning "outside
Miranda." It seems that the only way to prevent such practices
would be to overturn the Supreme Court's holdings in Harris and
Elstad, and no longer allow any statements obtained in violation of
Miranda to be admitted in evidence at trial for any purpose.
Insofar as these decisions are valid interpretations of the Fifth
Amendment, preventing the practice of questioning "outside
Miranda"is beyond the ability of any proposed alternative to the
Miranda doctrine. However, it should be noted that, because of
the absolute nature of the bright-line rules forbidding the
admissibility of any statements obtained by police through
promises of leniency or misrepresentations of evidence, no
questioning "outside" those prohibitions could take place.
A related issue that the modified videotaping regime may not
adequately address is the possibility of police circumvention. Even
though police are required to obtain a suspect's Miranda waiver as
well as his interrogation on videotape, it is conceivable that police
would be able to induce a suspect to waive his rights using
prohibited tactics, only to later record the suspect's subsequently
calm (and seemingly voluntary) waiver of rights. This is an
important concern, considering the immense impact a videotaped
confession can have on judges and juries in assessing a defendant's
guilt at trial. Unfortunately, it would be impossible to create a
rule that would be foolproof against deceit by officers of the
government. In implementing any rule governing police conduct,
one must assume that police take their responsibilities seriously,
and that, if properly trained, they would not view falsifying
evidence such as a Miranda waiver as an appropriate way to do
their jobs. If it is true that the majority of America's police officers
would construct false evidence as a means of circumventing brightline rules in order to obtain an admissible confession from a
suspect, then an immediate reform of law enforcement across the
country is required.
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren encouraged Congress and
the states to search for
alternative methods of regulating
custodial interrogation which would "increas[e] the rights of
individuals while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal
laws." 7 ' One such alternative has been proposed here. The
modified videotaping regime truly realizes the balance struck in
Miranda between the competing interests of suspects and law
enforcement in a custodial interrogation situation. It benefits
suspects by imposing clear boundaries on police conduct and by
reducing the coercive nature of custodial interrogations.
It
benefits the criminal justice system by imposing bright-line,
administrable rules and by reducing the likelihood of false

372. Id. at 467.
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confessions. It benefits police in that it promotes the efficient use
of police resources, facilitates better training and more effective
investigating, and imposes clear rules for police to follow. At the
same time, the detriments to police investigatory techniques are
small. The only restrictions placed on police conduct during
custodial interrogations by the modified videotaping regime are
the bright-line prohibitions against promises of leniency and
misrepresentations of the evidence against a suspect. These
tactics are by no means the only effective interrogation techniques
in the average interrogator's arsenal. In light of the significant
reduction in the inherent coerciveness of the custodial situation,
the availability of other techniques with which to elicit confessions
renders the costs of the modified videotaping regime minimal.
After over thirty years, it is clear that the Miranda doctrine
in its current state does not adequately combat the inherently
coercive nature of custodial interrogations. Nor does it strike an
appropriate balance between the interests of law enforcement in
investigating and clearing crimes and the interests of suspects in
not being compelled by the state to incriminate themselves. A new
alternative to the Miranda doctrine must be considered, if the
objectives of the Fifth Amendment are to be truly realized in the
interrogation room.

